Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

751G.5/8–354: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

top secret
priority

Washington, August 3, 1954—7:26 p.m.

689. Eyes only Ambassador from Secretary. Following is text of statement² mentioned in immediately preceding cable:³

“French Requests Involving Possible United States Belligerency in Indochina

The United States had made clear that it would take a grave view of open Chinese Communist aggression in Indochina.

[Here come quotes from Eisenhower’s speech of April 16, 1953⁴ and Dulles’ speech of September 2, 1953.]⁵

That latter statement had been made after prior discussion with the French Ambassador in Washington.

However, the foregoing statements, while they were intended to, and did in fact, deter open military aggression by Communist China in Indochina, did not fully meet the French preoccupations, as the situation developed in relation to Dien Bien Phu.

1. On March 23, 1953 [1954], General Ely, French Chief-of-Staff, called upon Secretary of State Dulles to express appreciation for the sympathetic reception which he had had in this country in discussing the military problems of Indochina. In the course of conversation, General Ely raised specifically the question of whether if MIGs from Communist China were to intervene in the battle of Dien Bien Phu, United States air power would in turn intervene to protect the French aircraft which were supplying Dien Bien Phu and which would be helpless against MIGs. The Secretary of State stated that he could not give at once a definitive answer to so serious a question. However, he pointed out that before the United States intervened as a belligerent, it would doubtless wish to take into account all relevant factors including the fact that such intervention could not be looked upon as an isolated act. Any such armed intervention would commit the prestige of the United States and would require it to follow through to a military success. This in turn involved political as well as military factors and called for a partnership understanding on the part of those concerned, which among other things should insure the patriotic participation of the local population and their effective military mobilization and training.⁶

General Ely’s request was not pursued and there was not, in fact, any air intervention from Communist China.

2. During the night of April 4, 1954, at Paris, the French Prime Minister and French Minister of Foreign Affairs asked United States Ambassador Dillon to meet with them and they expressed to him their opinion that immediate armed intervention at Dien Bien Phu by United States carrier-based aircraft would be necessary to save that situation.

The United States Ambassador at once reported this opinion to the Department of State⁷ and Secretary Dulles immediately replied through the United States Ambassador substantially as follows:

‘As I personally explained to General Ely at a conference at which Admiral Radford was present, it would not be possible for the United States to become a belligerent in Indochina without a full political understanding with France and other countries. In addition it would be necessary that Congress should act. I have confirmed this position with the President. The Executive is prepared to consider united action in Indochina. However, such action is impossible except on a coalition basis which would include active participation of British Commonwealth countries, in view of their great stake in Malaya, Australia, and New Zealand.’⁸

3. On April 23, 1954, during the course of a NATO Ministerial Council meeting in Paris, attended by Secretary of State Dulles, the French Foreign Minister showed Secretary Dulles a military report from Indochina which stated that it might be necessary to seek a cease fire unless there were immediate and massive air support by the United States, which it was thought might still save Dien Bien Phu.⁹

The next day, April 24, Secretary Dulles, after consulting on military aspects with Admiral Radford, the United States Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who was then in Paris, advised the French Foreign Minister substantially as follows:

‘We have considered this matter most carefully.

‘The situation with regard to our participation is the same as when I spoke with you on April 14. Under the circumstances, we should first need Congressional authorization for any such war action. This cannot be obtained in a matter of hours, nor do I think it can be obtained at all unless it is within the framework of a political understanding which would include other nations directly and vitally interested in Southeast Asia.

‘I may add that I have received military advice which indicates that at this stage even a massive air attack will not assure the lifting of the siege of Dien Bien Phu.’¹⁰

The foregoing are the three occasions when French officials suggested United States armed intervention in Indochina.

United States Parallel Efforts for ‘United Action’

During this March-June 1954 period, the United States was seeking to develop the possibilities of collective action in the Southeast Asia area, on a basis which would fairly reflect the free world interests which were involved.

[Here come quotes from public speeches.]¹¹

With the intensification of the Communist effort following the Berlin decision of February 18, 1954,¹² it seemed to the United States more than ever important to develop a united front as a counterweight to the probability of intensified effort of the Communist Vietminh, and increased material support to them from Communist China.

The following are steps by the United States in pursuance of this policy:

1. On March 23, 1954, Secretary Dulles met with the House Foreign Affairs Committee and discussed the desirability of publicly calling for united action in the Southeast Asia area. He invited and received suggestions from the Committee members in this respect. Thereupon, under the direction of the President, he drafted a statement on this subject which he then discussed with various Senators of both Parties. He then showed the proposed draft to the Ambassadors of certain other countries principally involved and learned that their governments, without commital, saw no objection to the proposed statement. The statement was then incorporated in a speech in New York on March 29. In that speech the Secretary of State reviewed the threatening situation in Indochina and noted the steps which the United States had taken to assist in the situation. He cited the President’s view (April 16, 1953) that the Korean armistice would be a fraud if it merely released aggressive armies for attack elsewhere and recalled his statement (September 2, 1953) ‘that if Red China sent its own army into Indochina that would result in grave consequences which might not be confined to Indochina.’ The Secretary went on to say that

‘Under the conditions of today the imposition on Southeast Asia of the political system of Communist Russia and its Chinese Communist ally, by whatever means, would be a grave threat to the whole of the free community. The United States feels that that possibility should not be passively accepted, but should be met by united action. This might involve serious risks. But these risks are far less than those which will face us a few years from now, if we dare not be resolute today.’¹³

2. Upon his return from New York, the Secretary of State thereupon conferred further and on a broader basis with Ambassadors of countries which might be interested in ‘united action’ to save Southeast Asia from Communist domination.

3. On April 3, 1954, the Secretary of State and Admiral Radford met with a group of Congressional leaders to review the situation in Indochina and the possible course of United States action with respect to it. It was the sense of the meeting that the United States should not intervene alone but should attempt to secure the cooperation of other free nations concerned in Southeast Asia, and that if such cooperation could be assured, it was probable that the United, States Congress would authorize United States participation in such ‘united action.’¹⁴

4. On April 4, 1954, the President met during the evening at the White House with a group of his advisers,¹⁵ following which communication was made by [to?] the Governments of the United Kingdom and of France inviting their prompt cooperation in organizing ‘united action’ in relation to Indochina and Southeast Asia. This led to invitations from the British and French Governments to Secretary of State Dulles to come personally to London and Paris respectively to discuss the matter.

5. Between April 4 to 9, 1954, the Secretary of State and other high State Department officers consulted in Washington with diplomatic representatives of Great Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Other Asian governments were kept informed.

The Governments of Thailand and of the Philippines promptly indicated their willingness to join in united action in Indochina and other Ambassadors indicated that they thought their governments would be sympathetic to the idea.

6. On April 10, 1954, Secretary of State Dulles left for London and Paris for direct personal discussions with the British and French Governments. On April 13, 1954, at London, after conferences with Mr. Anthony Eden, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and with Prime Minister Churchill, Secretary Dulles and Mr. Eden issued a joint statement which said:

‘Accordingly, we are ready to take part, with the other countries principally concerned, in an examination of the possibility of establishing a collective defense within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations, to assure the peace, security and freedom of Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific.

‘It is our hope that the Geneva Conference will lead to the restoration of peace in Indochina. We believe that the prospect of establishing a unity of defensive purpose throughout Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific will contribute to an honorable peace in Indochina.’¹⁶

7. On April 13 Secretary Dulles went to Paris and after discussions during that day and the next with the French President of the Council and with the French Foreign Minister, a joint statement was issued which said among other things:

‘We recognize that the prolongation of the war in Indochina, which endangers the security of the countries immediately affected, also threatens the entire area of Southeast Asia and of the Western Pacific. In close association with other interested nations, we will examine the possibility of establishing, within the framework of the United Nations Charter, a collective defense to assure the peace, security and freedom of this area.’¹⁷

8. Following the return of Secretary of State Dulles to the United States, the Department of State, in pursuance of its understanding of the foregoing, proposed that the diplomatic representatives at Washington of France, Cambodia, Australia, Great Britain, Laos, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam call on him on April 20, 1954 to examine the possibility of establishing the collective defense within the framework of the United Nations Charter to secure the peace, security and freedom of Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific. However, the British Ambassador informed the Secretary of State that the British Government felt that it was premature to hold such a meeting.

9. Subsequently, the Government of the United Kingdom explained to the United States and to the House of Commons its view that no concrete steps should be taken to organize ‘united action’ until the outcome of the Geneva Conference in relation to Indochina were clearer.

10. On May 7, 1954, Dien Bien Phu fell to the Vietminh Communist attackers.

11. On May 8, 1954, the Geneva Conference held its first plenary session on Indochina.

12. At this point, the French Government indicated that it would like to discuss comprehensively with the United States Government the political and military conditions which would enable the United States to intervene militarily in Indochina. The French Government was thereupon promptly advised through the United States Ambassador in Paris (May 11, 1954) that the President would be disposed to ask Congress for authority to use the armed forces of the United States in the area to support friendly and recognized governments against aggression or armed subversion promoted from without, provided certain conditions were met.¹⁸ The conditions then defined were subsequently summarized by Secretary Dulles in his June 11, 1954, address at Los Angeles as follows:

‘(1) an invitation from the present lawful authorities; (2) clear assurance of complete independence to Laos, Cambodia, and Viet-Nam; (3) evidence of concern by the United Nations; (4) a joining in the collective effort of some of the other nations of the area; and (5) assurance that France will not itself withdraw from the battle until it is won.’¹⁹

With reference to (5), the precise United States suggestion was that the French Government should not withdraw its forces during the period of the ‘united action,’ so that the forces from the United States—which it was then thought would be principally but not exclusively air and sea forces—and forces from other participating countries, would be supplementary to, and not in substitution for, the existing forces in the area.

13. On the basis of the foregoing, there occurred discussions at Paris; as to which other interested governments were kept generally informed by the United States.

14. The possibility of ‘united action’ in the fighting in Indochina lapsed with the June 20, 1954, decision of the French Government to obtain a cease-fire in Indochina, a result which was arrived at by the Geneva Conference agreements of July 20–21, 1954.”²⁰

Dulles

1. Drafted by Secretary Dulles. Repeated to Paris as telegram 438.
2. Regarding the preparation of this statement, see memorandum by Secretary Dulles to the President, Aug. 2. p. 1898. For information on subsequent developments with respect to the statement, see memorandum by Secretary Dulles to the President, Aug. 24, p. 1976.
3. Supra.
4. See editorial note, p. 472.
5. See editorial note, p. 747. Brackets in the source text.
6. For the memorandum of the conversation of Mar. 23, see p. 1142.
7. See telegram 3710 from Paris, Apr. 5, p. 1236.
8. The quotation is from telegram 3482 to Paris, Apr. 5, p. 1242.
9. See telegram Dulte 7 from Paris, Apr. 23, p. 1374.
10. For the actual text of the message, see telegram Dulte 1 from Geneva, Apr. 24, p. 1398.
11. Brackets in the source text.
12. For the pertinent portion of the final communiqué of the Berlin Conference, Feb. 18, see p. 1057.
13. Regarding the Secretary’s speech of Mar. 29, see the second editorial note, p. 1181.
14. See memorandum for the file, p. 1224.
15. See editorial note, p. 1236.
16. Regarding the joint statement, see telegram Secto 2 from London, Apr. 13, p. 1321.
17. For full text of the communiqué, see footnote 3, p. 1336.
18. See telegram 4023 to Paris, May 11, p. 1534.
19. Regarding the speech, see footnote 4, p. 1676.
20. See editorial note, p. 1859.