751G.5 MSP/8–354: Telegram
The Chief of the United States Military Assistance Advisory Group in Indochina ( O’Daniel ) to the Department of the Army 1
MG 3000 A. During recent conversation with Ely as result discussion concerning US consideration withdraw B 26 and C 119 acft2 he stated as follows:
“US evidently putting on our shoulders the loss of Tonkin. Don’t forget the precedents of China and Korea. We were not responsible in [Page 1904] those cases. All of us share responsibility for the situation here. I must say that I am profoundly displeased by all this. We still face the matter of the same battle for southern IndoChina. If the United States wants us to lose this too, tell us so and we will pull out. This is a common fight. It is not in France’s interest to fight on here alone. We need US assistance as much as ever if we are to participate in defense of southeast Asia. We are putting in all the men. All we ask for is equipment. There need be no question that the Vietnamese will have full independence and their own army with divisions. In addition they will have French forces to help out. When the French forces are no longer needed they will be pulled out. The US may suggest whatever date it considers necessary for our departure and we will be glad to go. Our Asiatic policy is not French alone, it is western. I must tell you frankly it is not pleasant to have the impression that after our eight years of fighting the US feels we are letting things go here. The trouble goes back to China. We had no responsibility there. Neither were we responsible for the Chinese aid to the Viet Minh after the Korean armistice. We all share the responsibility for what has happened. I object to dumping all the blame on the shoulders of one nation.”
Comment: My reply to Ely was that I thought US had done good job in supporting French needs. The ceasefire was bound to give various impressions concerning the situation. Once things have settled down the problem will be sorted out and seen in its correct light. What has happened is a natural reaction. I get the impression that there is great concern at home over the weaknesses of the Diem govt. There is a feeling that the enemy through his propaganda strength and infiltration tactics will win the elections, get all our equipment and then take over all of southeast Asia. Furthermore there are 11 million people in the north against 9 or 10 million in the south. With a pistol in their backs there is no doubt as to how the vote will go in the north unless sound measures are used in the south. The enemy is conducting his political warfare in exactly the same manner as a shooting war, in accordance with the principles of war. The Vietnamese govt needs help in every dept if there is to be any hope for victory. Ely replied “what we must do is win the battle for peace. This is another type of political warfare. If we give up ahead of time there is no hope for success. You must continue to help us. We can’t give up. We must win. I would have liked to have held the Tonkin. Two more divs would have been enough. I knew I could get two new divs from France but I still needed two US divs. However the US said no. This was an important element in our position. If I had had the certainty of two US divs, a different situation would have resulted. But that is passed now.”
Comment: A little intestinal fortitude in French high command and in Paris would have helped.
- This telegram was directed to the Department of the Army for General Ridgway, to be passed to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense. However, a typed notation on the source text indicates that it was not relayed to State. It has not been determined when the message was actually received by the State Department.↩
- In telegram MG 2079 A from Saigon, July 30, General O’Daniel reported his discussion that day with General Ely concerning the possible withdrawal of U.S. aircraft on loan to the French in Indochina. In the same telegram, General O’Daniel recommended against the contemplated withdrawal. (751G.5 MSP/7–3054)↩