751G.00/7–3054: Telegram
The Ambassador in France ( Dillon ) to the Department of State
[Received 5:25 p.m.]
438. Repeated information Saigon 40. Re Deptel 366 rptd Saigon as 3481 and Embtel 409 rptd Saigon as 34.2 We took up subject of reftel with La Chambre today citing our concern with future in Vietnam, question of effectiveness of Diem and possible alternate govts, importance of degree of independence French were prepared to grant to new state of Vietnam and great importance decisions on these questions would have in determining attitudes Vietnamese nationalists and ultimate success in retaining new state in free world. We referred to necessity putting into operation effective aid program and problems to be faced in determining its nature, manner of distribution, etc.
In reply, La Chambre stated it was his and Mendes-France’s firm intention to work in closest possible manner with us on all questions concerning Indochina. They were determined to do everything possible to win the elections (“we would use devil himself in order to win”) and realized that success could only be achieved if both France and Vietnam enjoyed full moral, political and economic support of US.
La Chambre said that for moment impossible to make any decision regarding Ngo Dinh Diem, for govt itself was undecided and was sending Claude Cheysson, former deputy political adviser to High Commissioner and recently member of French Delegation at Geneva (“Chauvel’s right arm”) to Indochina to make a quick inspection and recommendations to govt. Cheysson’s report, together with Ely’s and others would largely determine govt’s decisions. Cheysson leaves Paris tonight.
Govt is wary of Diem, primarily because they fear his lack of experience and unrealistic approach to problems may outweigh advantage his personal integrity. Moreover a great deal of his support came from Catholics in north and what was needed now was man with support in south. On other hand govt realizes that Diem’s personal honesty and unquestionable patriotism were great asset and they were [Page 1897] therefore reluctant throw support to alternate until something better was really in prospect.
They were thinking tentatively and subject entirely to Cheysson’s and other reports of possibility supporting retention Diem but advocating broadening his govt. Broadening might even be extended to including Tran Van Huu of whom French are wary but who they believe must be contended with. They are aware of Huu’s toying with extreme left including Viet Minh and his anti-Bao Dai sentiments and personal ambitions. They think, however, he is better under control than loose and that his over-developed political sense might be put to good use in balancing Diem’s own under-developed political sense. Furthermore, former Prime Minister Tam is also factor to be dealt with. They regard him as strong man whose power and effectiveness might prove useful in getting things done but whose reliability is questionable. La Chambre was not at all sure that Tam might not attempt to play with Viet Minh along lines govt of “national coalition”. Nevertheless he too was in running and would be subject to Cheysson’s and other inspection.
Regarding independence, La Chambre stated unequivocally that policy of the Mendes-France govt was to grant total independence to states “without retaining anything in the back of bureau drawer”. They intended to do so without delay but not through conventions supporting treaties of independence and association which were initialed under Laniel government. Formula would be entirely discarded in favor of following stages: First, transfer of all possible technical services to Vietnamese without delay. Orders have already been issued to Ely to do so before July 31. Secondly, those functions which require quadrilateral decision to be examined at Four-Power meeting of 3 states and France to take place in Paris on or about August 10. They include question of common currency, attachment to Franc Zone, etc. Finally any remaining functions to be turned over to Vietnamese Govt as soon after Four-Power meeting as possible. At moment it is envisaged that permanent basis of relationship between two countries will be as stated in two basic treaties (totally independent and thereafter associated within French Union on free and equal basis). There will be no further haggling about petty details.
Question of Bao Dai’s future role is, of course, also involved but it will be treated as phase two after other more immediate decisions are reached.
La Chambre expressed complete agreement with the sentiments expressed in last two paras reftel which were given him in full in paraphrased form.
During conversation La Chambre expressed concern regarding new Vietnamese Ambassador to US Tran Van Chuong. He did not mention [Page 1898] the forthcoming trip of Raphael-Leygues and Buu Hoi (Embtel 35 to Saigon rptd as 420 to Dept)3 but we observed that Raphael-Leygues was waiting in antechamber to see La Chambre as we left. It is apparent that Cheysson’s trip is an official mission while Raphael–Leygues is of secret character.
- Dated July 28, p. 1888.↩
- See footnote 3, p. 1889.↩
- Telegram 420 from Paris, July 29, read in part as follows: “Jacques Raphael Leygues, counselor French Union and Commissaire Principal de la Marine, has informed us confidentially he proceeding Saigon next few days secret mission for Mendès-France. Will have as associate on mission Prince Buu Hoi, cousin of Bao Dai and well known scientist, long time resident of France, counselor to Ho Chi Minh at Fontainebleau in 1946.” The purpose of the trip was to investigate privately the political situation in Vietnam. (751G.00/7–2954)↩