751G.00/7–2754: Telegram

The Chief of the United States Military Assistance Advisory Group in Indochina (O’Daniel) to the Department of the Army1

top secret

MG 2063A. Information Secretary Defense, JCS, Secretary State, CINCPAC and AmEmbassy Saigon. I was invited by [name deleted] visit his office a.m. 27 July 1954. … Opened discussion inquiring if US would train Vietnamese army. My reply this now being considered US. He estimated 50,000 regional troops and 56 Vietnamese battalions from Tonkin Delta area desire transfer to south (my estimate this overly optimistic). Plans being made accordingly. Desire US training as soon as possible. Anxious US MAAG remain here. Suspicion that we turning our backs on Vietnam. I assured him that I felt such was not the case. [Name deleted] asked outright will we continue support.

[Name deleted] stated Diem and entire present government strongly anti-Communist and nationalistic. [Names deleted] desire US advisors all echelons of government. Loyal Vietnamese will be selected for offices but will need and desire US advice. [Name deleted] remarked that with such US help we can survive but without it Vietnam is condemned. In addition to wanting US aid, nationalist group in government, [name deleted] stated Vietnam must have strong army and cannot have it without US assistance advisory capacity as well as matériel. I remarked that no doubt are discussing it at home. Considering fact that Vietnam Government has not been strong Bao Dai might try to change present government any time. Therefore we need assurances of intent and show of strength on part Vietnam. [Name deleted] acknowledged this and said that is what they were striving for. I mentioned Communists apply sound war-like combat principles in war they are waging in all fields. Present situation made to order for Communists favorite maneuver on battleground where now they need fear no armed interference. Mentioned that drastic measures need to be taken for [Page 1884] Vietnam for assistance. [Name deleted] agreed. He enumerated measures that need be taken. [Name deleted] stated that Diem considering buy land for government distribution to people (there are 8 or 10 landed estates area Saigon). Diem has decreed that refugees from north would be permitted take up temporary abode landed estates.

[Name deleted] fears France appeal Bao Dai for another Vietnamese Government more suitable French purposes. [Name deleted] mentioned that people of Vietnam have great confidence in US because of results Korea and Philippines, Vietnamese people feel that US honest and unselfish in efforts to help others. He stated this why Vietnam wants US advisors in all departments. Stated there enough good men nationalist leanings set up government and with guidance can be good one. Stated two things thought needed. System of alliances such as US and Philippine and opportunity become member SE Asia pact. He stated that the Vietnamese Government must get out from under French control. That present government desires do this. His opinion that Tam and Huu want to form another government with French interests predominant not so nationalistic. He stated now impossible use French assistance for training Vietnamese army since entire country has lost confidence French due recent experiences. He inquired whether possible send Vietnamese military personnel US and Philippine schools. I mentioned possibility of the Philippines assisting all fields. [Name deleted] said yes in case US did not, this would be good idea. I feel that perhaps behind the scenes we might influence situation here through Philippines should we not take active part ourselves. I am informed by reliable sources in Philippines that there are now members and former members Philippine army trained in US who are available use for training here.

. . . . . . .

We discussed need retain present government for long time to give it opportunity show its worth. He stated Vietnam needs US money, US matériel, US personnel help everywhere. He recognizes this very dangerous time preparing for future. [Name deleted] mentioned thought afraid we were pulling out. We discussed possibility uprising due cease-fire agreement. I mentioned it would be bad impression US should such thing occur. US would wonder could it happen to her sometime. He stated there no comparison in the feelings of the Vietnamese as to US and France. That US had impressed all SE Asia by its honesty and what it has done for Philippines and others. Hope for same assistance and results. He stated France must be forced get out. Stated “why don’t you cut off all support to them if they don’t agree to what you want.” He feels that in order US establish proper policy re Asia it was important that we use Asiatic methods. Stated our political position entirely too reserved and soft. Stated when Japs came Vietnam [Page 1885] in 1940–1941 they threw peace terms on the table and stated “this is it; sign”, and the French signed. I mentioned Diem advisability securing assistance in preparing conscription program. Perhaps some of General Hershey’s2 people could be borrowed for this. … stated hoped US would furnish means further guerrilla action against Viet Minh. Said why not send fiscal people here to apportion money and have them in all departments and watch distribution of money and in case money authorized that it not be given in large amounts in one package but smaller amounts broken down according to the needs of various projects.

I inquired if [name deleted] was also expressing sentiments of Diem and he assured me this was so in every case. Our conference lasted for two hours and we terminated with reemphasis by [name deleted] on need for US assistance in all fields in order Vietnam and SE Asia survive.

Comment: I feel there is great opportunity US assist in pointing Vietnam right direction. This area can be used as testing ground to combat—the warfare Communist would hope employ everywhere including US. I personally feel that consideration should be given to making effort toward establishing US strongly here. I feel we should take steps see that present Vietnamese Government remains long enough to prove itself; that we take active part in all fields here. …

My interpretation and Embassy re cease-fire agreement that we can bring in personnel here until 11 August 1954 and I strongly urge personnel taking part in Vietnamese army training and assisting all government echelons be rushed here as soon as possible. I feel that arrangements should be made so that US take over entire training program Vietnam army and pressure be brought to bear on French toward this end.

  1. This Army message was transmitted via Department of State channels.
  2. Maj. Gen. Lewis B. Hershey, Director of Selective Service.