751G.00/7–2454: Telegram
The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State
308. Repeated information Paris 116, Geneva 69. Reference Paris telegram sent Department 303 repeated Saigon 22, Geneva 44.1 I find view expressed by Chevallier and others in Paris that it was necessary to achieve Geneva settlement in order to preserve French Expeditionary Corps in north from destruction contrary to facts and undignified glossing-over of France’s decision to drop Indochina war. Ely has repeatedly said to me that, having drawn in his lines to form Hanoi-Haiphong rectangle, he was convinced he could hold [Page 1878] latter without reinforcements until end of September and could hold it indefinitely with two, certainly with three, extra divisions. Without such reinforcements he said he was certain of his ability to hold Haiphong enclave with much less force than 85 battalions he had in North. In fact, he said that, given naval air support, he could have held Haiphong enclave with 35 to 40 battalions. Chevallier’s assertion that military situation required armistice on present terms also overlooks our conditional offer to participate in war—conditional but on conditions which were reasonable and realizable.
- Telegram 303 from Paris, July 22, read as follows: “We are informed by Chevallier (Independent), Secretary of State for War, that military situation of French Union Forces in Indochina prior Geneva settlement was considerably worse than generally admitted. He states if settlement had not been reached at Geneva and Viet Minh should attack in Delta, now doubtful whether more than 4,000 Frenchmen could get out of Haiphong alive.” (751G.00/7–2254)↩