751G.00/7–2354: Telegram
The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State
304. Repeated information Paris 113, Geneva 68, Hanoi 89. I asked to see Ngo Dinh Diem this morning. He told me that he had not seen text of armistice nor was he informed of Under Secretary’s statement made at final meeting of Geneva Conference.1 I gave him résumé of latter.
Diem said to me that problems confronting his government were almost superhuman but he was disposed to tackle them with will and faith. He was not planning to resign.
Greatest obstacle was growing popular belief that US as a result of arrangements with other Western Powers, to gain ratification of EDC or for some other reason of policy, had abandoned Vietnam and Indochina. He asked me if indeed that was not the fact. I assured him emphatically that our economic aid was still continuing. I reminded him that we had received no request or plan from his government for assistance in meeting new problems confronting him.
He thereupon said that if his government were to be able to combat defeatist drift toward Viet Minh, he would need a definite public assurance of American aid and support. It is by no means a question merely of economic aid. He would need expert assistance that simply could not be found in Vietnam and probably could not be provided by France. Accepting armistice as a traffic [tragic?] fait accompli he must endeavor to transfer Catholic and other anti-Communist elements from north to free zone of Vietnam.
If he could have public assurance of American aid and support, he believed it would be possible that 1 million, perhaps even 2 million, northerners would take refuge in south. (Comment: General Ely believes no more than 200,000 refugees will voluntarily leave Tonkin Delta. He admits faint possibility that through dramatic propaganda Diem might persuade 1 million or more to go south where, in plateau region, space could be found for them. Ely added that if Diem did succeed in such a project of migration he would win eventual national elections.) I reminded Diem that French had promised to arrange for transportation of refugees at their cost to new homes.
[Page 1873]Diem went on to say neither his own people nor, he feared, the French could handle refugee problem of such magnitude, but US with its experience in human relief and its organizing ability could.
Diem heard with disappointment my statement that we were arresting MDAP shipments, except replacements, at this time in accordance with armistice (Deptel 261 to Paris, Saigon 257).2 He was somewhat relieved by my further statement this action would provide breathing space to undertake evacuation of supplies and arms from Delta and give us time to evaluate situation and develop future policy. I told him further that in opinion of General O’Daniel there were enough arms and equipment already in Vietnam for maintenance and training of his army.
Ngo Dinh Diem expressed earnest hope that our budgetary support of Vietnam defense effort could continue unreduced and asked that instead of being funneled through French, it be provided directly to his government, I told him I was not in position to inform him on that score at present.
Comment: Until I have had more observation of his performance, I cannot be certain that Ngo Dinh Diem will succeed in leading a national movement of military and political reconstruction against tremendous obstacles that face him, among which are war lord “confessional” groups of Cao Daists, Hoa Haos and Binh Xuyen, not to mention southern separatists. He has shown courage in not submitting to three sects named above and political prudence in not antagonizing them. He has shown good sense, I think, in not dismissing General Hinh, Chief of Staff of Vietnamese National Army, although he knows latter is not loyal to him, until he can find a competent successor and nucleus of loyal officers. He has national reputation for sincerity, nationalism and honesty. There is no other man known to us or to best French observers to replace, with any chance of success at this moment, Diem as head of government.
I recommend that President promptly telegraph and make public a personal message along following lines:
“Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
“As I said in my press conference on July 21,3 I think that when the freedom of a man in Vietnam or in China is taken away from him, our own freedom has lost a little. I do not believe that we can continue to exist in the world geographically isolated, and that if we can find a concerted, positive plan for keeping the free nations bound together, none of them will give up.
“As the Under Secretary of State said at Geneva, the United States Government was not prepared to join in the declaration of the Geneva Conference although it took note of the agreements concluded at Geneva on July 20 and 21 between the France-Vietnamese command [Page 1874] and the command of the People’s Army of Vietnam, as well as paragraphs 1 to 12, inclusive, of the declaration presented to the Geneva Conference on July 21.
“I should like to underscore what the United States representative at Geneva said when he stated that, with respect to Vietnam, the United States reiterates its traditional position that people are entitled to determine their own future and that the United States will not join in an arrangement which would hinder this.
“As you know, Mr. Prime Minister, the United States for some years has supplied both economic, military and financial assistance to France and Vietnam for the purpose of assisting Vietnam in the war in Indochina. I shall be pleased to recommend to the Congress that, insofar as possible, economic and other assistance be continued for the state of Vietnam until this country is once more united in terms of democratic equity and freedom.
“With my best wishes for the success of your courageous efforts for the welfare of your country.”4
- See editorial note, p. 1859.↩
- Dated July 21, p. 1866.↩
- See editorial note, p. 1864.↩
- In telegram 323 to Saigon, July 26, the Department of State informed the Embassy that the draft statement was under consideration. In the meantime, Ambassador Heath was advised to supply Diem with a copy of the armistice agreement and a copy of the statement regarding the Geneva settlement issued by Secretary Dulles on July 23. (751G.00/7–2354) The Secretary’s news conference statement of July 23 regarding the Geneva Accords affirmed the dedication of the United States to the principle of self-determination of peoples and to the prevention of the further spread of Communism in Southeast Asia. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 2, 1954, pp. 163–164.↩