751G.00/7–2154: Telegram
The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State
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274. Repeated information Paris 100, Geneva 57, Bangkok unnumbered. General Ely sent for me shortly after noon today. He had just received the last of a series of telegrams giving him the main details of the cease-fire agreement. He said that they are far from ideal but he had feared they would be much worse. He was willing to sign a cease-fire agreement on these terms.
He was particularly delighted at the extension of the time for the evacuation of Haiphong to 300 days. He said, significantly, and repeated the statement “in that time perhaps the whole situation can change”.
Comment: Almost on every occasion I have talked with Ely he has told me he would prefer to carry on the war to victory with American and other international participation along the lines he had discussed in Washington.
Prior to receiving all these telegrams he had gone to see Ngo Dinh Diem but had been unable to obtain from the latter any assurances that he would refrain from opposing the armistice or that he would not resign. All that Diem would say was that he had a “problem of conscience” which he had not resolved. Ely assured Diem that he would give him all possible support but whatever came he must maintain order and discipline. Ely said he was somewhat relieved by a telegram from La Chambre saying that the head of the Vietnamese delegation, while protesting the agreement, had assured them he would not oppose its being carried into effect. Ely was also informed that Bao Dai had telegraphed Diem to remain on the job.
Ely urged me to see Ngo Dinh Diem and urge upon him to remain in office and issue orders to his troops to accept the decisions and orders of the French High Command. I told him that my position was somewhat difficult since Diem had not sent for me nor had I received as yet instructions from my government.
Ely said that he had not seen the full terms of the armistice and did not know whether they might prevent the reception of American matériel or even the continuation of MAAG. He said that if such stipulations were made in the armistice they must be “gotten around” (tournée). There ought to be some sort of base for the reception and [Page 1864] storage of material in the vicinity, perhaps “between Tonkin and Singapore”.
He said that obviously if remaining Vietnam were to be saved from communism the United States and France must work together to provide economic and military aid.
Ely said he was already withdrawing some troops, including a regimental combat team, from the northern delta to be stationed in central Vietnam where military forces were too weak compared with the Viet Minh. He did not contemplate any return of forces to France. He had asked Paris for the prompt assignment of a certain general officer to work out plans for the placing of French forces withdrawn from the north, some to be stationed in Saigon, others at Tourane, Haiphong and a base constructed, he thought, at Cam Ranh Bay.
Returning to the subject of Ngo Dinh Diem, he thought the latter might be the man to head a government of military and political reconstruction in Vietnam but he would have to surround himself with a larger and more representative cabinet. Diem possessed one quality, rare in Indochina, that of being absolutely honest. On the other hand he was not, in Ely’s opinion, over intelligent.