751H.00/7–2054: Telegram
The Chargé at Phnom Penh (Goodman) to the Department of State
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21. Sent Saigon 29, Department 21, Bangkok 8, Geneva 18. Emergency Cabinet meeting this morning prepared reply to urgent telegram from Cambodian delegation Geneva requesting instructions as to answers to approaches from French, Soviet and Chinese delegations—and to two ideas presented by three Western Powers. Delegation said it needed answer by July 20. Government most concerned about implications these approaches, and when Acting Foreign Minister Poc Thoun said I had requested appointment which he had granted for afternoon, Cabinet almost had him see me immediately in hope I had more information for them. Answering telegram approved by King, was sent at noon, and I saw both telegrams shortly after, Poc Thoun having been instructed to show them to me.
Delegation said that French asked whether Cambodia would accept (1) cease-fire without guarantees, (2) amnesty “all Cambodians” without government reprisals against them, and free elections as soon as peace and security restored, (3) banning of external military aid during duration Vietnam truce. Soviets said they would insist on (1) no foreign military bases on Cambodian soil, and (2) no military alliances with any country. Chinese said Cambodians must not accept American instructors for armed forces.
Delegation added that US, British and French delegations had suggested that Cambodia accept cease-fire without guarantees, with verbal understanding that three Western Powers would provide adequate guarantees for this nation’s security outside Geneva framework. Delegation added that this meant within structure of some Southeast Asia Defense Organization. Delegation also asked what should be its position if a general truce were proposed tomorrow.
Government answer was no to all French, Soviet and Chinese proposals except amnesty Cambodian rebels and elections, saying its policy always had been to grant such amnesty and to hold elections as soon as peace restored and security conditions justified move. However, Cambodia cannot accept limitations its sovereignty involved in other proposals, and could not limit forces until they were at level necessary to protect nation of five million people. Cease-fire without removal of Viet Minh forces in country would “legalize” invaders position in Cambodia, and sovereign nation must reserve right to enter alliances including those establishing friendly bases on its soil (King added thought that there are in fact no foreign bases in Cambodia) and must also reserve right to employ advisers regardless of nationality.
[Page 1859]Concerning Western counsel to accept cease-fire and rely on promise of free-world guarantees within some other framework, government reiterated Son Sann’s Geneva statement of July 13 as to conditions under which Cambodia would accept “neutralization”, and said it hoped urgently that a Southeast Asia organization would protect Cambodia either through the latter’s membership in it, or in a neutral status which such an organization would guarantee. Government also gave delegation freedom of action (within policy framework already laid down) in committing Cambodia to truce formula which might be forthcoming at conference, saying it could not make decision itself without seeing proposal.
Poc Thoun said government deeply depressed at this turn of events, but had expected nothing better from Geneva. If Western Great Powers supported a formula to end war which made Cambodia defenseless, this country could not prevent the situation. It would not, however, acquiesce in its own destruction by agreeing to absurd conditions, not in slightest relevant to nation’s actual problem, which gave up to Communists independence won from French.
According to Poc Thoun, Son Sann, returned this morning from Geneva, expressed his opinion at meeting that severity of Communist demands resulted largely from Cravel [craven?] desire of French to achieve peace at any price, which he said had resulted in degree Viet Minh arrogance which had to be seen to be believed.
Although this development has caused it to waver somewhat, Cambodians still exhibit confidence in US ability and willingness to help them in this terrible situation. They want to be strong and forceful in face of Communist aggression, but understand painfully their dependence on large-scale outside assistance. For long they have expected no real strength from French and therefore are not surprised at that country’s miserable performance, but they still hope we will provide power necessary to balance and stop Communists outside Cambodia’s borders.1 Government hoped today I would provide clarification and reassurance, which, of course, I could not do, not having slightest inkling as to course our policy taking. We have not had communication here from Department or Geneva for some ten days, and I would appreciate information and guidance.
- In telegram 26 from Phnom Penh, July 22, Goodman reported that Prime Minister Penn Nouth had reiterated Cambodia’s desire for direct military assistance from the United States. (751H.5/7–2254)↩