751G.00/7–1654: Telegram
The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State
[Received 2:18 p.m.]
214. Repeated information Geneva 44, Paris 83, Hanoi unnumbered. I saw Ngo Dinh Diem this morning. He said he had no real idea what was occurring in Geneva. The French delegation there was obviously not keeping his Foreign Minister informed. He asked me what would happen if he rejected agreement reached by the French with the Viet Minh; what would be the US reaction? I said the question was highly hypothetical. It depended on what the terms of the agreement were. I had informed him of the American-British understanding, resulting from the Washington talks as to the minimum assurance which an accord with the Viet Minh must present before we would engage to respect it. Rejection of an agreement on his part would be a grave step not to be undertaken lightly. One solid fact of this situation was the French Expeditionary Corps of 185,000 men which could not be replaced at the present time by any power or combination of powers. Neither could the Vietnamese National Army in its present state of training, discipline and strength hope to do battle on even terms with the Viet Minh Forces in the north at least. Diem then said that he would insist that the line of demarcation be at the [Page 1843] 18th parallel. He would reject any line south of that which incidentally would give the Viet Minh two capitals, Hanoi and Hue as well as the port and airfield of Tourane. He said he would insist if Hanoi could not be retained for “remaining Vietnam” that it and the southern provinces in the Tonkin delta be internationalized; their future to be decided by an eventual plebiscite or elections.
As regards elections he would insist that they not be held for two years. He understood the Soviets were asking for elections twelve months after cease-fire. That was too short a date.
- 2.
In addition to his troubles and misgivings over the course of events at Geneva, he was having extreme difficulties with the Binh Xuyen sect which controls the Security Police, with the Army under General Hinh, son of ex-Prime Minister Tam whom Cochin Chinese separatists and certain French financial interests were intriguing to make president of a southern Vietnamese republic and Cao Daists and Hoa Haos.
He was determined to get rid of the Binh Xuyen who were simply “gangsters” of the worst sort. He would eventually succeed and eventually he would do away with their gambling concession which furnished most of their funds. Unfortunately this concession also paid the state taxes amounting to 200 million piasters annually. If he suppressed legalized gambling he asked whether the US would make good the loss in revenue to the state for a year. I said that obviously we could not do just that but it might be that our economic assistance and the budgetary assistance for Vietnamese defense, which so far we had been providing through the French Government, would enable him to do without the gambling tax.
He said he was equally determined to get rid of Hinh but he could not do so at this moment. Actually the only “security” of his government at the present time was that furnished by the French Union Forces.
- 2.
- Returning to the Geneva conference he said that he would flatly reject any suggestion the Viet Minh be allowed to enter a coalition government or any coalition arrangements. It was impossible to work with or indeed negotiate with the Viet Minh. They were no longer nationalists but international Communists.