751G.00/7–1254: Telegram
The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State
155. Repeated information Paris 64, Geneva 30, Hanoi unnumbered. I told General Ely today that acting under instructions I had informed Ngo Dinh Diem of kind of provisional agreement on cessation of hostilities in IC which US and British (as result of Washington talks) might be prepared to respect (Deptel 121, July 10).1 I inquired whether he had been authorized to notify Ngo Dinh Diem of course of Franco-Viet Minh conversations at Geneva. He replied that he was asking permission from Mendes-France so to inform Diem. All he had done heretofore was to indicate to Diem that trend of conversations regarding regroupment was in direction of a provision partition. He said he expected to see Diem shortly and hoped instructions to acquaint him fully and frankly of conversations with Viet Minh would have arrived.
I informed Ely that Diem was insistent on vital necessity that Vietnam retain Hanoi-Haiphong-southern province enclave in Tonkin. Ely said that if the intention was to renew hostilities, presumably with American participation, that of course was position to take. If there were no willingness to renew hostilities, there was little chance of retaining anything in north except Haiphong enclave, which in any case must be retained for a considerable time to permit of evacuation of people and matériel. He said Vietnamese Government had asked him in case French decide to abandon Hanoi to let Vietnamese units now in French Union Northern Command defend city. Ely said without French direction and support Vietnamese defense of city could not last three days.
[Page 1818]He told me that he was disquieted over indications of political activity by General Hinh; that he would have to have a talk with him soon. Hinh had certain military qualities, but he was a “light weight (leger)”. He had been more active as a politician than a general.
He was also disquieted by steady stream of desertions from Vietnamese units in north and he attributed this partly to uncertainty provoked by Geneva Conference and lack of remedial action by Hinh and new government. Desertions were not yet serious in extent, but might easily become so.
He said he felt certain of being able to hold Hanoi at present but at end of September or early October he would probably be unable to do so unless reinforcements arrived promptly. Chinese were stepping up their shipments of artillery, trucks and other equipment.
Viet Minh probably had fifty 105s at present time to use against Hanoi and increasing quantities of anti-aircraft artillery.
- Reference is to telegram Tosec 529 to Geneva, July 10, which was also sent to Paris as telegram 124, to Saigon as telegram 121, and to London as telegram 190. For text, see vol. xvi, p. 1324.↩