751J.5/7–1054: Telegram
The Chargé at Vientiane (Rives) to the Department of State
[Received July 11—7:52 a.m.]
3. Sent Saigon 5, Department 3, Geneva unnumbered, Paris 3. In connection with military talks Geneva I wish offer few observations re possible results solutions which may be reached concerning Laos.
- 1.
- If armistice agreed on with regroupment French areas Plaine des Jarres and Seno, Colonel De Crevecoeur has stated French Union troops might almost as well be evacuated completely. Lao Army insufficient and incapable watching frontier and holding vital border points. Therefore, renewed Viet Minh attack would find best troops too far from borders (example is Central Laos where key limestone hills stretching west from Mu Gia defile would be left open upon withdrawal French forces to Seno).
- 2.
- If all French forces and foreign military personnel withdrawn, Lao National Army would fall apart. Not only do French officers still run staff but encadre certain units, especially technical ones and six French Union Lao battalions which would be given Laos.
- 3.
- Furthermore, in all Laos there is one qualified doctor assisted in provinces by moderately capable first-aid men and nurses. All other doctors are French military, who care for civilians as well as military personnel. Also, virtually all weather and radio services at airports handled by French military.
- 4.
- In event war continues, formation division new men has been proposed. French Command believes this wishful thinking in view present difficulties filling requirements though few more battalions might be raised.
- 5.
If armistice signed and Viet Minh theoretically leave Laos serious difficulties face Lao Army at best. Approximately half of 30,000 men are volunteers whose enlistments already ended but held at insistence French Command. Upon cessation hostilities already voiced desire Lao Government release these men will become too strong be resisted (viz. US post-World War II). Resultant need training new troops obvious.
In opinion of French military, and I agree, best to be hoped for in such event is rebuilding Army to present strength, equipping it properly and concentrating on effective training without attempt at sizable enlargement. This decision will probably be forced upon Laos in any case by Chinese demand that Laos and Cambodia limit forces.
- 6.
- Not be omitted is question supplying equipment Lao Army under any condition. French feel always possible smuggle necessary things from Thailand but I consider this poor idea propaganda-wise even if [Page 1812] possible get by proposed observation teams Thailand and Laos. In view five points only real solution is present one demanded by Lao Government. Even then I do not believe Viet Minh will evacuate guerrillas. As already suggested by Embassy Saigon, formation stockpile equipment now appears wise. Laotians eager welcome MAAG people as inspectors or for actual training. However, latter impossible now due to treaty signed with France last year and because French would never relinquish overall command unless cooperate by Paris.
Whether solution reached or not at Geneva, militarily, future course Laos seems lie in forming well-trained and equipped force of approximately 40,000 including technicians, and to join an area defense agreement.