Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

611.51/7–954: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State

top secret
priority

Paris, July 9, 1954—8 p.m.
[Received 6:48 p.m.]

118. Repeated information London 27, Geneva 14. London for Aldrich; Geneva for Johnson. For the Secretary. In absence of Ambassador Dillon, Joyce¹ saw Mendes-France at one o’clock today and provided him orally with substance Department telegram 85.² Mendes-France after hearing United States position as set forth reference telegram made following points:

1. He asked that his personal greetings be extended to you as well as his expression of deep appreciation of your message which indicated sympathetic understanding of French position. He said he could take no exception to anything contained in your message.

2. Mendes-Frence emphasized French had been giving and would continue to give to Americans full and complete information regarding military plans and developments in Indochina as well as what was developing in negotiations at Geneva. He added that Chauvel had provided and would continue to provide complete information to Johnson.

3. He understands that it is difficult for us to commit ourselves in advance to result which cannot be foreseen, but added this is precisely his difficulty now. He had no idea what Communist side would come up with at end of next week and added that he wished to emphasize again he had no more information than we did on what they would offer.

4. Mendes-France stated French negotiating position was precisely along lines of seven points set forth in United States and United Kingdom memoranda. He stated he would not accept any Communist terms which did not in substance meet these seven points.

5. He then said with obvious deep feeling and emphasis that the considered presence of yourself or Bedell Smith at Geneva “absolutely essential and necessary”. He added that if Americans on highlevel were absent, the Communist side would automatically and inevitably draw conclusion that there was important split between three Western powers and that result would be that their terms would be even harsher. In other words, any impression we give of lack of unity at this critical point would obviously be interpreted as weakness and indecision which would mean opposition would automatically press for more.

5. [sic] Mendes-France stated with great emphasis that he had a deadline and that deadline was not July 21, nor July 22, nor any later time, but was midnight on July 20. He did not intend Geneva would turn into a Panmunjom and he proposed to tell Molotov this as soon as he sees him in Geneva. He went on to say it would be almost impossible for him to meet his own deadline in absence of his high-level Western friends and colleagues. With high-level persons present, last-minute decision could be taken which would be impossible with only subordinates present who would have to refer to their superiors and await inevitable delays of telegrams back and forth.

6. He did not believe that without high-level American presence in Geneva the Communists would offer him anything which he could accept. But even if they did, our absence would mean to them that we were disinterested and they could with impunity thereafter proceed by usual tactics of infiltration, subversion and threats of force to take over in toto in spite of any agreement not backed up and reinforced by United States and United Kingdom.

7. Mendes indicated that our high-level presence at Geneva had direct bearing on where Communists would insist on placing line of demarcation or partition in Vietnam.³

Dillon

1. Robert P. Joyce, Counselor of Embassy.
2. Dated July 8, p. 1795.
3. In telegram 130 from Paris, July 10, Ambassador Dillon further reported that Joyce had been told by Margerie and Parodi of the French Foreign Ministry that they considered Premier Mendès-France entirely sound on basic international issues. Margerie had stated that the position of the Premier on Indochina was virtually identical with that of Bidault. (611.51/7–1054)