Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

611.51/7–854: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France¹

top secret
priority

Washington, July 8, 1954—7:24 p.m.

85. For Dillon, Aldrich and Johnson. I think it is probably true that if we had put together all of the bits of information given at various times and at various political and military levels at Paris, Geneva, Washington, Saigon and Hanoi, the result would have been a reasonably clear picture of French military intentions as now revealed. I have never harbored any thought of any wilful concealment. Also I have always conceded that the French were clearly within their rights in making their own plans. I have repeatedly said at press conferences that we recognize that the French had the primary position in Indochina and that our role was that of a friendly observer who wanted to help if and when our help was wanted.

I do feel that there is a certain lack of any intimacy which is perhaps due to the fact that we have not in the past worked closely with the personalities of the present Government who have been plunged into an immense and engrossing task. In this respect they have our sympathy and I hope that you will try to remove any impression of carping criticism on our part.

We are quite prepared to agree that France has been overextended in relation to Indochina and we are not quarrelling with present French policy designed to limit its commitments more nearly within the bounds of its strength.

Our present intentions to leave representation at Geneva at the present level of Ambassador Johnson is primarily because we do not want to be the cause of any avoidable embarrassment by what might be a spectacular disassociation of the United States from France. Whatever France may be determined to do, we accept as within its prerogatives. We only regret that we cannot agree to associate ourselves in advance with an end result which we cannot foresee. Equally, we do not want to be in a position of seeming to obstruct an end result which from the French national standpoint seems imperative to its parliament and people.

Since starting to dictate this, I have received through Bonnet a message from Mendes-France strongly urging that either Bedell Smith or I should come back.² This apparently based on my today’s press conference statement that neither of us had any present plans for returning.

I told Bonnet the substance of the preceding paragraphs to the effect that while we would be only too happy to contribute to a united front, we could not do so without knowing on what position that front was based. If there were a position which France was able to define and state that she would not accept anything else, then we would be able to judge whether or not that afforded the foundation for a united front. At the moment, it seems to me that there is less danger of doing irreparable injury to Franco—American relations if we avoid getting into a position at Geneva which might require a disassociation under spectacular conditions which would be deeply resented by the French as an effort on our part to block at the last minute a peace which they ardently desire.

We have not yet taken any irrevocable decision and even if no one from here comes over for the 12th, we would be standing by here under circumstances such that if developments at Geneva seem to indicate that our presence there would serve a really constructive purpose one or the other of us could get to Geneva overnight.

Unless you perceive objection I would like you to explain orally my position to Mendes-France, making clear that we are motivated by our estimate that in the end our presence at Geneva, even though initially it seemed an asset, might subsequently prove a liability to Franco-American relations.

Code Room:—Please note

For London only. Please show Eden portion of this cable which follows first two paragraphs. Portion begins “We are quite prepared, etc.”³

Dulles

1. Drafted by Secretary Dulles. Repeated for information to London as telegram 151 and to Geneva as Tosec 526.

2. The Secretary of State’s office record of a telephone call received from Ambassador Bonnet at 5:41 p.m. read as follows:

   “B. said Mendes-France is unhappy because the Sec. or the Under Sec. is not going back. The Sec. said it would be one thing to go if we had any idea of what will come out of it. We don’t want to go when disassociation would be more damaging to our relations than if we didn’t go. In the past we have had a common position. The Sec. said he is not critical of this as he knows they are operating under a popular mandate. But there is no joint position as when we went to Berlin. The Sec. said they may have to accept a solution we won’t like, but we don’t have to become a party to a solution we don’t like. The Sec. did admit it is not a final decision. B. indicated he would pass this on. The Sec. said if we knew the French would stand on the 7-point position, we should be glad to go and help. But if we started with this and ended with something else, it would put a strain on our relations. B. said he doesn’t think, territorially speaking, it will be much worse. The Sec. said we have no reason to hope for this with confidence. The Sec. said a united front has to stand on an agreed position. The Sec. said he realized you don’t think you want to reach an agreement on that, and maybe you ought not. They left it they will speak tomorrow or in a few days.” (Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, “Telephone Conversations”)

3. A letter of July 9 from Ambassador Makins to (Secretary Dulles stated that Eden continued to consider it important that either Dulles or Smith attend the concluding stages of the Geneva Conference in order to present a united front. (Presidential Correspondence, lot 66 D 204)