Office of the Historian

751G.00/7–854: Telegram

The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State

secret
Saigon, July 8, 1954—8 p.m.
[Received 12:45 p.m.]

105. Repeated information Paris 46, Hanoi unnumbered. Prime Minister Diem called on me this morning having previously asked that General O’Daniel be present.

1.
Diem repeated insistently that if French gave up Hanoi it would be practically impossible to form a viable Annam-Cochinchinese State. Cochinchinese were too easy going either become soldiers or to resist Communist subversion. Fall of Hanoi would have a catastrophic psychological effect. He asked if US could not publicly and immediately announce that any settlement that would involve surrender of Hanoi to Viet Minh would be unacceptable to it and he sought US to use its influence on French to insist on retention of Hanoi.
2.
Referring to Secretary’s Los Angeles speech of June 11,1Diem [Page 1794] insisted that only thing that would save Indochina, indeed all Southeast Asia, would be American intervention.
3.
He said it was urgently necessary for Vietnamese national army to be given autonomy. O’Daniel and I both agreed with him and suggested that Ely would undoubtedly be disposed to meet his wishes on that score. O’Daniel explained his concept of training and structure of Vietnamese Army but pointed out that at this time it would be impossible to withdraw Vietnamese battalions from Tonkin Delta or organize them there into autonomous forces.
4.
To Diem’s complaint re French evacuation of southern Tonkin Delta provinces, O’Daniel replied that such an action had been militarily unavoidable given the insufficient strength of French Union Forces. He pointed out that new contracted front in north was still longer than Korean front, which was defended by 20 divisions, whereas French had only equivalent of about 11 divisions in delta.
5.
O’Daniel referred to recent desertions and urged Diem to issue a proclamation calling on Vietnamese troops to stand fast and be loyal to French command. Diem agreed as to necessity of such action but indicated it would be somewhat difficult to draft an effective proclamation at this moment.
Heath
  1. See footnote 4, p. 1676.↩