751G.00/7–754: Telegram
The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State
92. Repeated information Paris 41, Geneva 23, Bangkok, Hanoi unnumbered. With McClintock I saw General Ely yesterday afternoon. He seemed in better health than when I saw him some four months ago, confident and determined. He is against a cease-fire and for carrying on the war. He said that he still believed that the successful prosecution of the war in Indochina was essential to the defense of Asia. He personally would welcome American participation along the lines that he had discussed several weeks ago in Washington. To hold the Viet Minh, however, he needs another two divisions, not so much for Tonkin as for the south since he believes the Viet Minh might detach some of their divisions now investing the northern delta for an operation towards the south where there is no force which could now withstand them. Contrary to rumors of disaffection he believes that he can count on the loyalty of the Vietnamese battalions in French Union Forces in the north, although he said he would feel safer on that score after the inspection he is making today and tomorrow in Tonkin. While he is in general confident of the morale of his troops it is a fact that they are tired and another reason for the necessity of a two division reinforcement which he has requested would be to give needed rest to certain units now in the line. Actually, he said, he needed three divisions but he thought such a request would frighten the French Government.
He made no apology for the restriction for the Hanoi-Haiphong defense perimeter and said he personally had taken decision on May 15 to evacuate the three southern bishoprics. Because of need for military security the decision had naturally to be kept most secret until operational date arrived.
Ely said that he had one additional withdrawal to make in Tonkin; namely a sector west of Hanoi which would further reduce defense perimeter to line of Day River. He had not, however, yet fixed date for this operation.
Militarily Ely said it would be sound if French Expeditionary Corps evacuated Hanoi and fell back forthwith on the Haiphong redoubt. However, this would have immediate and catastrophic political repercussions, and although as a general he perhaps ought to complete this movement, as Commissioner General he intended to stay and fight for Hanoi even though he might be beaten. Ely said, however, if the government made a deal giving the Viet Minh Hanoi he would, of course, obey orders and withdraw his troops, but he said he would thereupon tender his resignation as Commandant and Commissioner General.
[Page 1791]He said he had seen the identical notes which the British and Americans sent after the Churchill–Eisenhower talks. He did not comment on those notes other than say that he had been disagreeably struck with the suggestion that the Haiphong enclave be held “if possible”. This enclave must and could be held, he asserted, because among other reasons the offensive for the delta could be started from it to regain the delta. The Haiphong perimeter would be an essential beach-head which would serve as potential threat to Communist Chinese and thus strengthen hand of French negotiators at Geneva. In any case he said Haiphong must be held for a considerable time, even if the rest of Tonkin were conceded to the Viet Minh, to ensure the safe evacuation of the expeditionary corps.
Speaking generally Ely expressed regret that vacillations of American public attitudes had encouraged Chinese Communists to feel that there was no real western opposition to any demands which might be made for an Indochinese settlement. He still hoped, however, that if we could adopt a more robust attitude, bargaining position in Geneva would be strengthened. He said in this connection that one additional advantage of US undertaking a training program in Vietnam would be that it would be interpreted by Communist side as tangible proof of US determination not to let Vietnam become Communist.
He said Mendes-France and certain other members of French Government are willing to request Parliamentary approval for sending conscript troops to south Vietnam, but that others in Cabinet were dubious and some even opposed. In consequence he was not certain when or if this measure would be advocated by Mendes-France.