751G.00/7–454: Telegram
The Chargé at Saigon (McClintock) to the Department of State
48. Repeated information Paris 20 Geneva 10 Hanoi Bangkok unnumbered. Prime Minister designate Diem asked me to see him last night upon his return from Hanoi and Hue. His brother Nhu had likewise just returned from Hanoi and both were in a highly emotional state.
Diem said that he had made a formal protest to General Salan in Hanoi against evacuation of the three southern provinces of Tonkin. He said that Salan had refused to receive him or to entertain his formal protest for a delay of 12 hours on grounds that “military secrecy” must not be impaired. It was only afer this delay that Salan, having accomplished a fait accompli, received the Prime Minister designate and listened to his by then fruitless demand that the evacuation be stopped.
Diem said repeatedly throughout our conversation he was convinced French intend to evacuate Hanoi. I made no comment other than to point to General Ely’s statement on leaving Paris that he intended to fight to hold delta, adding that our own military felt that shortening of Tonkin defense perimeter was advantageous from defense point of view. There is no doubt, however, that Diem is convinced French plan eventual withdrawal from all of Tonkin except possibly Haiphong enclave.
Brother Nhu who had spent an extra day in Hanoi was even more envenomed with hatred for the French as the result of his meeting with the Bishop of Phat Diem. According to Nhu’s account, populace of Phat Diem on June 30 had gone to beachhead for evacuation when suddenly Bishop returned to Phat Diem by air in a forlorn attempt to rally militia to a last fight. Populace then returned to town but when Bishop saw that it was not possible to conduct an effective resistance he then told people to proceed to beachhead for evacuation. Crowd approached beachhead which was guarded by a French fort placed before a bridge on road leading to river. At this point French fort refused crowd access to bridge. Vietnamese militia then fired on fort with result commander of fort called on French Air to bomb the throng with heavy casualties. Nhu at one point said 10,000 were killed [Page 1783] and at another point 20,000. In his highly overwrought state it is difficult to judge accuracy of this account and I suggest we hold judgment in abeyance until we have had an opportunity to check.
Nhu also said most of civil population were unable to escape from Nam Dinh as French had commandeered all motor transport and French [apparent omission] of trucks would not accept refugee passengers except upon payment of 100 piasters bribe per head.
Whether these stories are true or not fact remains that two men Charged with forming new Government of Vietnam are at an almost insane pitch of hatred against French. How necessary cooperation can be worked out between French Military Command which is sole bulwark against an immediate capitulation to Viet Minh and these passionately envenomed civil leaders will be no mean job.
Diem said that he had decided to form a government despite all obstacles and that he would commence that very night in consultation with prospective ministers. He asked if we had any objection to General Xuan whom he had called back from France to serve as a counselor. I said that this Embassy refrained from comment on Vietnamese personal ties and that all we wanted to see was a strong and able government formed as quickly as possible.
Repeatedly during conversation the brothers said that everything depended on American aid. Diem said that both in Hanoi and Haiphong populace thronged upon him asking what assistance he was bringing from America. I said that at this bitter hour I did not wish to take refuge in juridical arguments but that both brothers could understand that United States could scarcely commit itself in Vietnam without knowing policies either of newly formed Mendes-France Government or of as yet unformed Diem Government. Furthermore, of conditions laid down wisely by Secretary as set out in his Los Angeles speech regarding possibility of United States participating in united action here, none of these conditions had yet been met.
Diem showed a curious blend of heroism mixed with a narrowness of view and of egotism which will make him a difficult man to deal with. He said that only his presence in Hanoi had prevented populace from stampeding and that his arrival in Hanoi had been welcomed as that of a saviour. In one breath he criticized French for criticizing Bao Dai and then said that Bao Dai should never return to Vietnam as his life would be in danger. He said advisors in Hanoi had cautioned him not even to mention Bao Dai’s name as this would be prejudicial to Diem’s own chances of gaining necessary adherents.
Diem is a messiah without a message. His only formulated policy is to ask immediate American assistance in every form including refugee relief, training of troops and armed military intervention. [Page 1784] His only present emotion, other than a lively appreciation of himself, is a blind hatred for the French.1
- McClintock added the following in telegram 63 from Saigon, July 5: “My British colleague informs me that unsolicited opinions reaching his Mission are unanimous in indicating that Diem is regarded as ‘being in the American pocket.’ I said our pocket was much too small for such a requirement, and that Diem was not an American candidate or champion. I likewise told Graves that Diem’s only ‘policy’ was based on hope of American aid, but that I had assumed ungrateful task of spelling out to him conditions established by the Secretary as prerequisite to US participation in united action here.” (751G.00/7–554)↩