651.51G/7–754
Memorandum for the Record, by Captain George W. Anderson, Jr., USN, Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Radford)1
On Friday afternoon, 2 July, General Valluy, accompanied by General Stehlin,2 called on Admiral Radford. The purpose of the visit was to report to Admiral Radford the conversations by General Stehlin and General Ely during General Stehlin’s visit to Paris.
General Stehlin said that General Ely had sent his very best regards to Admiral Radford. He stated that General Ely was a very unhappy man in the light of the present situation at Geneva and in Indo-China.
General Ely had returned from Indo-China to Paris primarily to ascertain the position of the new French government with respect to Indo-China, and to obtain needed reinforcements for Indo-China. He had not participated in any of the negotiations with the Viet Minh as these were entirely in the hands of the politicians.
General Ely desired that Admiral Radford know that the regrouping of the French forces in the Tonkin Delta was being accomplished with the sole object of improving the military security of the French Union Forces in the Delta to take care of any eventuality resulting from the negotiations at Geneva. This regrouping was well underway and would serve to provide the French badly needed mobile groups for use in the Delta area. He hoped that he would be able to hold Hanoi but was not certain of this in the event that the Viet Minh elected to launch a major attack.
General Ely envisaged that the negotiations at Geneva might lead to a partition of Viet Nam along the line south of the Tonkin Delta. However, General Ely recognized the necessity for having reinforcements regardless of how the situation at Geneva went. He had obtained a commitment from the present government to press for authority from the French Assembly to send the first of the newly formed divisions [Page 1779] to Indo-China leaving France about 20 July. Since this would involve the assignment to Indo-China of conscripts, it was recognized that this was a very delicate decision. The present government of France supported the move. What the decision of the Assembly might be would not be known until next week.
General Stehlin informed Admiral Radford that General Ely was very anxious for the United States to take over the training responsibilities as proposed by General Ely to General O’Daniel. General Ely was aware of the factors which precluded the United States from making a decision to accept this responsibility at the present time. Admiral Radford explained to General Stehlin that he did not feel that he was justified in making any recommendation for the United States to assume such responsibilities in the present obscure situation. The United States was unaware of what the future might hold, and therefore Admiral Radford could not justify any expansion of U.S. activities in Indo-China for the present.
General Stehlin said that General Ely was getting along very well with General O’Daniel and that General O’Daniel was of assistance to him. He hoped that General O’Daniel might soon be promoted to the rank of lieutenant general which he had given up when he first went to Indo-China. Admiral Radford stated that this was another matter on which he was not yet prepared to make any positive recommendation until it was more apparent as to what the situation would be in Indo-China after the Geneva Conference.
In response to a query posed by Admiral Radford to General Valluy regarding General Valluy’s statement to the Five Power Military Conference in Washington on ultimate defense lines in the event the Tonkin Delta was lost, General Valluy stated in substance as follows: He did not envisage that it was reasonable to expect the establishment of a good defense position in the event that the Tonkin Delta was lost. The logistic situation, particularly as regards to lines of communications, would be difficult even though a sufficient number of troops could be made available, which in his opinion was doubtful, to hold such a line.
Admiral Radford pointed out the particularly complicating factor in Indo-China at the present time due to the virtual non-existence of a Vietnamese government. He stated that it appeared to him that the Vietnamese were without any effective leadership and this was contributing to the deterioration of morale which was already low, due to the worsening of the military situation. General Valluy agreed that the situation with respect to the Vietnamese government was very bad.
General Stehlin stated that he and General Valluy had accompanied the French Ambassador to the United States to Westover Field, Massachusetts, to see the first plane carrying wounded from Indo-China [Page 1780] enroute to France. Both General Stehlin and General Valluy expressed their admiration for the manner in which the United States Air Force was handling this mission, and their appreciation for the excellent care which the French wounded were receiving.
- On July 7, Scott of the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State circulated this memorandum to the following individuals: Under Secretary Smith, Murphy, MacArthur, Merchant, Drumright, and Beam (S/P).↩
- Maj. Gen. Paul Stehlin, French Air Force, deputy to the chief of the French Military Mission in Washington.↩