PPS files, lot 65 D 101, “Indochina”

Draft Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President1

top secret
1.
We have outlined to the French the terms of an agreement on Indochina which we could respect. I think we can be certain that in presenting the same terms the British have made it clear to the French that they would be satisfied with less. I am afraid we have to expect that the French will not succeed in getting our terms from the Communists.
2.
If no new element is added to the situation, it seems almost certain that the kind of agreement which the French will make with the Communists will involve neutralization of Laos and Cambodia, and political arrangements with respect to Vietnam which will assure a subsequent rapid takeover of that country by the Communists. We should be clear in our own minds that the kind of a settlement we can expect will inevitably lead to the early communization of all of Indochina.
3.
Such an outcome will dangerously increase Communist appetite for further expansion; dangerously decrease the will and capacity of the remaining free states of Southeast Asia to resist such expansion; bring heavy political and economic pressure on Japan for a shift from its present policy of cooperation with us, and lead to defeatism in and recriminations among the United States and its Allies, particularly France and the UK.
4.
We have up to now set conditions for US intervention which included prior agreement to act with us on the part of at least some of our major Allies. In the face of the present probability of the loss of all Indochina, and the consequences of that loss, I believe we should [Page 1775] review our policy. It is clear that the UK will not now agree to put forces into Indochina. It is clear that without UK agreement neither Australia nor New Zealand will give prior agreement to cooperate in intervention. If we are going to act, our initial decision must be on the basis of acting alone.
5.
But if at this point, in the light of our present recognition that we cannot at best save more than a part of Indochina, if at this point we were prepared to tell the French and the Communists that we would if necessary use US forces to prevent loss to Communism of at least that part of Indochina which lies South of the line Thak Kek-Dong Hoi, I believe such a statement would have an effect on the French, on the Communists, and our Allies which would radically alter the situation.
6.
The French of course want a settlement very badly. But they are eager to salvage something out of Indochina. Their own honor and prestige and the future of the French Union are involved. Vietnam is one of their principal overseas customers and they have cherished cultural institutions in South Vietnam. The French are anxious not to do anything which will lessen the major economic and political benefits which they get from their connection with us. US assurance that it would support negotiations to preserve the Southern part of Indochina, and if necessary would use US forces to preserve that area would instill confidence in the French that they could secure such a settlement from the Communists, and would fortify them in their negotiation for such a settlement. I believe the French would stay with us on this position.
7.
I also believe that the Communists would agree to a settlement which would leave the South free, if they were convinced that the alternative was the introduction of US forces and a possibility of an expanded war. The Communists would in fact be getting about all they probably expected to get when the Geneva Conference began. They have repeatedly shown that they do not want a war at this time. I think there is every chance that a revival of their concern over the possibility of US intervention would lead them to accept what would be in fact an at least temporary partition of Indochina.
8.
Our other Allies might not immediately join in a threat to use force to preserve the South. If our threat brought a settlement they would, however, be prepared to include the South of Indochina in a collective defense zone. And even if a settlement is not reached, I myself believe, that we would have active support from some of them immediately, and eventually from all of them.
9.
We should not, of course, ignore the dangers that such a course would involve. Even though I believe that the French would stay with us, and that the Communists would accept our terms, we would [Page 1776] have to be prepared, if things did not turn out that way, to take whatever action was necessary to keep the South of Indochina out of Communist hands. This might, if the French caved in completely, involve assisting the local governments while the French stood aside. And it might also mean that we would be fighting the Communists to maintain a line across the waist of Indochina although the risks of this would be considerably less than would be involved in US intervention in Tonkin.
10.
I believe, however, that a US decision that if necessary it would use US forces to prevent the loss of Southern Indochina, and that if necessary it would act alone, would have every prospect of bringing the Communists to agreement, and of securing the support and cooperation of the French and eventually of our other Allies. The possibility of such a decision may not exist for many more days. Either negotiations between the French and the Communists, or local developments in Indochina, may in the next week or two, so transform the situation that US intervention would be clearly impracticable.
11.
We are faced, probably for the last time, with a choice between the risks involved in threatening and if necessary undertaking US military intervention, or the probable loss of all of Indochina. I believe the prospects of success without a conflict and without harm to our Alliances are sufficient to justify us in deciding now to make use of the threat of employment of US force.
  1. By covering memorandum of July 2, Robert R. Bowie, Director of the Policy Planning Staff, transmitted this draft to Under Secretary Smith, Murphy, Drumright, Merchant, Phleger, and MacArthur as a vehicle for resolving the issue of what action to take in regard to Indochina. A notation by O’Connor on the source text indicates that it was seen by Secretary Dulles. There is no evidence, however, that this paper was transmitted to the President.