Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 292

Record of a Meeting in the Office of the Secretary of State, Wednesday, June 30, 1954, noon¹

top secret

Washington, June 30, 1954, noon

Participants:

• The Secretary
• The Under Secretary
• Mr. Robertson
• Mr. Bowie
• Mr. MacArthur
• Mr. Merchant
• Mr. Byroade²
• Mr. Stelle
• Mr. Gullion
• Mr. Sturm
• Mr. Tyler
• Mr. Draper

1. Replying to Mr. Robertson’s question as to whether and to what extent the US would be willing militarily to support the settlement in Indochina, the Secretary stated that we would be willing to do so except that the French had refused to meet even some of our conditions or, for that matter, to make a request. He referred to Australian and New Zealand reluctance to associate themselves with us. Mr. Robertson warned that the best opinion was agreed on the necessity of bolstering a settlement militarily in order to prevent the eventual complete loss of Indochina.

2. Mr. Bowie thought perhaps it was time to review the relevance of the US conditions and tell the French that before we will allow Indochina to be written off we will come to the assistance of the Associated States regardless of the French attitude. This would mean sending, if necessary, US ground forces. He developed at some length his thesis for placing the additional four divisions (as estimated in the Five-Power talks) across the Dong Hoi line.

3. The Under Secretary thought Mr. Bowie’s views too extreme; the French, he pointed out, are preparing an orderly withdrawal from the delta which will then provide some strength in the south and Mendes-France is planning to ask for authority to send conscripts to Indochina. The real question, he said, is what we will do following the cease-fire. Mr. Bowie interjected that the Viet Minh will not be content with the terms of a settlement and will move ahead throughout the rest of Indochina if the French are not backed strongly.

4. The Secretary said that Bonnet had called him this morning with a message from Mendes-France asking for a reply (see Aide-mémoire) as to whether the US would use its influence with Laos and Cambodia in getting them to accept a French-Viet Minh settlement. The Secretary told Bonnet it is difficult to use our good offices blindly without knowing what the settlement would be but that if it were within the terms outlined in our reply to the French, perhaps we would not say anything.³ It was generally agreed that we should not throw away our last negotiating lever with a precipitate agreement to the French request.

5. Two suggestions were discussed but left in abeyance because the real problem still remains:

(1) Mr. Merchant’s idea of a public declaration that “on the assumption Laotian and Cambodian independence is respected and that some part of Vietnam is left intact and politically whole, we would regard any move across the lines drawn in such a settlement as an act of aggression to which the United States might react militarily.” (It was pointed out that the Communists would be willing to join in the declaration, a sort of guarantee by the Geneva powers, and yet could get what they wanted.)

(2) Mr. Byroade suggested publicizing a US troop movement to the Philippines (perhaps through the planned redeployment of US troops from Korea).

6. The Secretary said he thought the UK would water down its reply to the French Aide-mémoire but that the UK would be willing to help protect a settlement along the lines outlined in the US–UK reply.

7. The Secretary said it was difficult to agree to Mr. Bowie’s thesis involving the sending of US divisions into Indochina. Mr. Bowie reiterated that the loss of Indochina will be a terrible blow to US prestige throughout the world. The Secretary said, however, that Asian and European public opinion would be unanimous in opposition. The operation, he added, would be similar to what we did in World War II in fighting the French in Casablanca so that we could then fight the Germans. We need a better case for Congressional and public opinion.

What he would like to do, the Secretary said, and what he has been trying unsuccessfully to achieve for over four years, is to play a game of tit-for-tat with the Communists, e.g., when the Commies grab land we grab some from them. For example, he would like to take over Hainan Island if the Chinese move over their present boundaries. This, he said, would produce a real scare in the Communist world.

8. Mr. Robertson said that our real trump card is the fact that the Commies are uncertain and worried over US intentions and what our posture might be in reaction to further Communist aggression. He thought that if we supported the French diplomatically we could get a rather acceptable settlement. Mr. Phleger said that this might produce Communist intransigence and thus prolong the war. Mr. Robertson said that this would be better from the US point of view because US public and Congressional opinion could then be more easily convinced of the necessity for intervention.

9. Mr. Bowie said, and Messrs. Phleger and Robertson agreed, that we ought to give the Australians and New Zealanders a better and more specific idea of our intentions, with the thought in mind that their reaction to a square proposal would be far from craven.

The meeting closed with a discussion of the British attitude which, according to the Secretary, leans [more] strongly in favor of a settlement in Indochina than do [does] the French.

1. Drafting officer not identified. This memorandum was prepared on July 1.
2. Henry A. Byroade, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs.

3. Telegram 24 to Paris, July 2, repeated to Geneva as Tosec 510 and to Saigon as telegram 24, read as follows: “FYI Bonnet July 1 phoned Secretary with message from Mendès-France asking for reply to that part Bonnet’s aide-mémoire July [Jane] 26 concerning whether US would use its influence with Vietnamese with view persuading them accept a French-Viet Minh cease fire agreement.

   “Secretary told Bonnet we could not take a position for or against any such undertaking since we do not know precisely provisions of agreement.” (751G.00/7–254)

   For the text of the French aide-mémoire, see telegram 4852 to Paris, June 28, p. 1755; for the U.S.—U.K. reply, see telegram 4853 to Paris, June 28, p. 1757.