Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

751.5 MSP/6–1254: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France¹

secret
priority

Washington, June 28, 1954—7:10 p.m.

4853. Re Deptel 4852 repeated Geneva Tosec 489 and Saigon 2746.² In concert with your UK colleague you should when further instructed by Department make parallel communication following reply to French Aide-Mémoire set forth reftel. This reply has been cleared by Eden and we expect Churchill’s concurrence tomorrow morning.³

In drafting this reply below we had in mind that it should tend stiffen French position so that they would not accept terms which we would be unwilling respect. (FYI UK sending a similar message Jebb⁴ but is informing him that he may orally add that HMG would be willing if French Government desires to give diplomatic support to French Government in order secure an agreement on lines set forth joint instruction below. This we are unwilling to do as we informed British. End FYI.)

Begin verbatim text.⁵ The US Government/HMG have taken note of the French Government’s communication. They appreciate being informed of this expression of the French Government’s position in the current negotiations for an armistice agreement on Indochina. The US Government/HMG would be willing to respect an agreement which:

1. preserves the integrity and independence of Laos and Cambodia and assures the withdrawal of Vietminh forces therefrom;

2. preserves at least the southern half of Vietnam, and if possible an enclave in the Delta; in this connection we would be unwilling to see the line of division of responsibility drawn further south than a line running generally west from Dong Hoi;

3. does not impose on Laos, Cambodia or retained Vietnam any restrictions materially impairing their capacity to maintain stable non-Communist regimes; and especially restrictions impairing their right to maintain adequate forces for internal security, to import arms and to employ foreign advisers;

4. does not contain political provisions which would risk loss of the retained area to Communist control;

5. does not exclude the possibility of the ultimate unification of the Vietnam by peaceful means;

6. provides for the peaceful and humane transfer, under international supervision, of those people desiring to be moved from one zone to another of Vietnam; and

7. provides effective machinery for international supervision of the agreement. End text.

Dulles

1. Drafted by MacArthur. Repeated to Geneva as Tosec 490, to Saigon as telegram 2748, and to London as telegram 7147.
2. Supra.
3. In telegram 4858 to Paris, June 29, the Embassy was informed that the text of the message had now been approved by the British and should therefore be delivered to the French Government in concert with the British Embassy. (751G.00/6–2954) Ambassador Dillon reported in telegram 5099 from Paris, June 30, that the message had been delivered. (751G.00/6–3054)
4. Sir Gladwyn Jebb, British Ambassador in France.

5. The first draft of the text which follows was developed by a U.S.-U.K. working group which met at the Department of State on Saturday afternoon, June 26. That draft was circulated as U.S. document CEV Memo–7, June 26. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 339) The draft, as slightly revised, was approved by Secretary Dulles and Foreign Secretary Eden at their meeting of June 29 as document CEV Memo–7b. At the Eisenhower–Dulles–Churchill–Eden meeting of June 29, the British confirmed their approval of the joint instructions. For the records of the meetings of June 29 and document CEV Memo–7b, see volume VI.

   On July 1, Secretary Dulles reported to the National Security Council on the Churchill–Eisenhower conversations. The summary of his report contained in the memorandum of discussion at the 205th NSC Meeting read in part as follows:

   “Secretary Dulles said that the most significant action with respect to Southeast Asia had been the formulation of a joint US–UK position regarding a settlement in Indochina. This joint position had been communicated to the French Government and basic instructions with regard to this position transmitted to our representatives at Geneva. In general this position indicated what we would be willing ‘to respect’ by way of a settlement. In substance, Laos and Cambodia would be left as free and independent states with the capability of maintaining their integrity. Likewise, approximately half of Vietnam would remain non-Communist south of a line drawn approximately along the 18th parallel. In the course of defining this joint US–UK position, differences of view had emerged. The US had hoped to produce a definite agreement with the UK not to accept anything less favorable than this position. Churchill and Eden, on the other hand, had merely wished to state a hope that the French wouldn’t settle for anything less than this position. A compromise had been reached, but complete agreement was not achieved and we will continue to take a stiffer line than the British.” (Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file)