Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2

790B.5/8–453: Telegram

No. 90
The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Burma¹

secret

Washington, August 21, 1953—6:49 p.m.

118. Your 107,² London 509 repeated information Rangoon 6.³

1. Department concurs generally penultimate paragraph your 107 but would wish your views on following considerations before London Embassy discusses subject with UKG:

a. UK–Burma military agreement presently gives BSM opportunity exercise degree influence over size and mission GUB armed forces. UK presumably aware limitation this leverage.

b. Generally speaking Service attachés consider GUB military planning taking place within reasonable framework and “within GUB capabilities after period technical training and development maintenance facilities.” On long lead items particularly we assume GUB would make provision for such training and maintenance since GUB principal loser in absence such provision.

c. US recognizes value BSM as training organization and hopes that UK–Burma relationship be maintained, but Department considers any impression US endeavoring pressure GUB into undesired military relationship UK by manipulation US reimbursable military assistance must be avoided.

d. US attitude GUB should indicate we are not using reimbursable military assistance as lever or establishing policy conditions precedent our selling arms to Burma. In practice scrupulous adherence this attitude should not lessen and may indeed increase solicitation of advice from Service attachés by GUB thus broadening base mutual confidence already achieved.

e. Cost to GUB of expensive equipment should act as most effective brake on impractical requests, and unavailability should be used only sparingly as excuse for non-supply unreasonable items. It seems important that limitation in arms received by GUB be in last analysis primarily GUB ability to pay if we are to avoid GUB impression that either alone or in conjunction with UK we are endeavoring pressure GUB into our mold. Present western orientation GUB military thinking should be encouraged.

2. For early US action it would seem important that presently known UK views regarding GUB arms list be transmitted without delay and that US be placed as soon as possible in position inform GUB on availability and price of requested items.

Without at present voicing to UK considerations discussed above, request you pouch to Department present GUB requests for all Services with attaché comments indicating as best you can those items which:

a. UK prefers to furnish and is ready to furnish.

b. UK is not willing to furnish but which it has no objection to our furnishing.

c. UK believes should be denied either for present or permanently with its reasons.

3. We would hope that future discussions in London could include point-by-point examination of controversies not resolved on Service basis Rangoon. We would at that time hope receive full statement UK reasoning and its acceptance general considerations set forth in (1) above.

Smith

1. Repeated to London.
2. Document 88.
3. Dated Aug. 4; it commented that the problem presented in telegram 107 from Rangoon required a governmental rather than a service level solution with the British and suggested that the Embassy sound out the British Foreign Office on the subject. (790B.5/8–453)