790B.00/2–452: Telegram

No. 9
The Secretary of State to the Legation at Saigon1

secret

1142. Legtel 1541 Feb 4, London tel 3357 Feb 1 (not rptd Hong Kong). Fol statement was drafted for possible release to press. Although it was not released it is Dept’s official position on question and shld guide all discussion of matter by the various missions: [Page 10]

“A nr of questions have been asked about the Chi Natl troops in Kengtung in North Burm and the activities of the Chi Natl Gen Li Mi. What Dept knows about these matters comes largely from intelligence sources and Dept’s info is to the fol effect:

“It is understood there is a relatively small nr of Chi Natl troops in North Burm who represent the remnants of certain Chi Natl elements which were driven out of Yunnan province into North Burm by Chi Commies at the time of the collapse of Chi Natl resistance in Yunnan in 1949. About the same time certain other fugitive elements of Natl troops escaped across the Indo-Chi frontier where they were interned by the Fr mil auths there. According to reports recd by Dept, sometime last spring Gen Li Mi led his Natl troops back into Yunnan in an attempt estab an anti-Commie center of resistance there with the stated purpose of ult displacing Commie control of the area. Concerning press reports from Formosa, Gen Li Mi was said to have held the appt of Gov of Yunnan province from the Chi Natl Govt. The attempted move into Yunnan is reported to have been abortive and it is further understood that Li Mi’s forces returned across border into North Burm where they are believed still to remain, scattered over a considerable area and where they are understood to be a source of concern to Burm Govt.

“Re Gen Li Mi himself, reports indicate he went to Formosa some time ago and has been in contact with Natl leaders there during the past few months.

“Dept has noted nr of statements from fon sources to effect that large nrs of Chi Natl troops have recently been introduced into North Burm from Formosa or elsewhere, and it is even charged that this has been done with Amer help or support. Insofar as these statements and charges relate to Amer assistance they are entirely without foundation in fact. Moreover there is no indication from any of our sources that there has been any such movement of Chi troops. It is the view of Dept that these statements and charges are either (a) based on ignorance or (b) deliberate propaganda play calculated confuse world pub opinion and create fictitious issues. There is further possibility that some of the persons responsible for these statements, although themselves acting in good faith, have been deceived by false info.”

Fol for your background info: there have been numerous allegations of US complicity and Commies have made charges that US Govt furnishing supplies, arms, ammo and that Amer officers are with troops. Matter was discussed at some length during recent session GA when Sov rep rptd charges against US and Burm del accused Chi Natl Govt of aggression. Denials US involvement by Secy and other US officials supported by Thai, Chi and Burm dels have done much to counteract charges against US.

Although problem essentially one for Burm to solve, Dept has long recognized dangers inherent in presence these troops on Burm soil, but because of inability Burm to disarm and intern them and reluctance Burm and Thai Govts antagonize Chi Commies, Dept [Page 11] can see no practicable means of removing them. Only possible actions appear to be (1) leave troops in Burm where they wld remain source of annoyance to GOB, wld continue offer standing pretext for Chi Commie intervention and wld become increasingly difficult to manage and restrain from provocative action, (2) disarm and intern troops which GOB unable accomplish and which troops and Li Mi will probably continue to be successful in resisting (3) repatriate troops to Taiwan via Rangoon, which GOB opposes because offensive to Chi Commies (4) repatriate to Taiwan via Thai, which opposed by Thai and which we do not favor because wld expose Thai to danger Chi Commie retaliation.

We have three times made representations in Taipei and believe further approaches wld not only be unproductive but wld annoy Chi Natls and raise charges that we not sympathetic to anti-Commie activities. This is of course untrue. We have never concealed our sympathy for any action to embarrass and combat Chi Commies wherever it may be. However we consider this operation in Burm inconsistent, due to pol considerations as well as time and space factor, with best interests struggle against Commies. As you are well aware extreme nationalism and fear of old style colonialism are outstanding characteristics of newly independent regimes S and SE Asia. We believe it important retain friendship peoples this area as last foothold of freedom in Asia. This purpose wld not be served by action which wld convince them of our desire embroil them in East-West struggle and which cld provoke Chi Commies snuff out independence both Burm and Thai at time and in manner inconvenient for us counter.

As for possibility UN action in situation, Dept has informed US del Paris as well as interested posts that:

a.
Composition POC cld result in submission majority and minority reports and POC investigations might reveal connections between KMT and Thai natls thus involving Thai in hazardous relations Chi Commies.
b.
Burm have advised us that they wld find proposal POC very embarrassing GOB.

If Burm invites POC or ad hoc Comm, or if Burm agreeable to proposal such measures by other friendly power, US wld not oppose and might support.

US position this matter seems beyond reproach. It is therefore duty all US officials abroad to emphasize foregoing pts and to counter efforts by Commies to persuade world opinion to contrary by dramatic repetition.

Acheson
  1. Repeated to London, Paris, Rangoon, New Delhi, Taipei, Hong Kong, and Bangkok.