690B.9321/7–2453: Telegram
No. 86
The Ambassador in Burma (Sebald) to the Department of State1
89. I called on Acting Foreign Minister Kyaw Nyein late yesterday at his request discuss KMT problem. Kyaw Nyein asked what I learned on my visit Bangkok, saying GUB feels committee unable make further progress. I explained complexity of situation on Chinese side in view some divergence opinion between [Chinese] government represented by Colonel I, jungle generals and General Li Wen-pin. Some delays inevitable but assured him all interested parties doing everything possible convince KMT leaders accept and [Page 120] implement agreement formulated by committee. Also mentioned minor difficulties pertaining Chinese civilian internees and apportionment costs.
Kyaw Nyein said latter two problems appeared not difficult but real question was whether Chinese Government sincerely cooperating in endeavor repatriate troops. Said GUB firmly convinced Chinese Government has cleverly given appearance doing everything possible assist but in fact has made decision not withdraw troops. In consequence he was thinking advising National Defense Council (which met last night) announce deadline to committee for implementation agreement failing which Burmese representative would withdraw. Felt GUB should simultaneously issue public statement its conclusion re failure Chinese Government cooperate.
I said my conclusions re situation was one of subdued optimism as I felt committee just beginning come to grips with problem repatriation and that further time required convince KMT leaders implement agreement. Should GUB withdraw from committee all hope for solution would disappear. Consequently I felt it essential Burmese representative continue assist other committee members in resolving problem. Also strongly advised against public statement. Kyaw Nyein countered by saying UNGA being convened mid-September and that sooner or later decision must be reached re Burmese preparation of report in accordance UN resolution. As little time left he felt necessary set time limit. I reiterated further arguments as above and suggested withdrawal from committee would be tactical error. I feel he will respond favorably and that Burma will not withdraw.
Continuing, Kyaw Nyein said he felt it necessary GUB plan ahead as it now appears probable even after report to UN KMTs will not have withdrawn. Said he had been thinking in terms making some sort arrangement with CPR, perhaps “non-aggression pact” under which CPR would assist GUB in driving out KMTs, CPR doing the fighting in connivance with Burmese Army. I asked who would then drive out Chinese Communist troops to which he replied “we would if necessary appeal UN and start merry-go-round all over again”.
I said this was dangerous line of thought and felt sure he knew it to be so. I hoped he was not speaking seriously. He replied was entirely serious but had not and would not make this proposal to his colleagues at present time. He thought, however, that out of desperation if committee and UN failed something must be done.
I again counselled utmost patience and continuation negotiations which must of necessity break down should Burmese delegate withdraw and assured him US doing everything possible insure success committee’s work to which Kyaw Nyein said GUB most appreciative [Page 121] efforts US Government but unfortunately logic of situation is such US probably gone as far as it can vis-à-vis Taipei Government and still has obtained no positive results.
Comment: I do not take too seriously Kyaw Nyein’s remarks re accommodation with CPR in view his known stand against communism and all it represents. However it is possible his remarks reflect thinking some his Cabinet colleagues … and for this reason suggested line of action if KMT problem not resolved should not be entirely dismissed. Kyaw Nyein has previously been entirely frank and honest with me and I believe he is shrewd enough realize he cannot impress me with remarks that could so easily be construed as pressure.
- Repeated to Bangkok and Taipei.↩