Taipei Embassy files, lot 62 F 83, “KMT Troops in Burma, 1952–1953”

No. 71
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador in the Republic of China (Rankin)

top secret

Participants:

  • President Chiang Kai-shek
  • K. L. Rankin

I called on President Chiang by appointment at 10:30 this morning and reviewed with him various matters which I had discussed with Admiral Radford in Hongkong on April 28.

With reference to Burma I said that both Admiral Radford and I considered it important that the Chinese Government take further positive steps toward remedying the situation involving General Li Mi’s forces in northeast Burma. Specifically, I urged that he appoint a qualified military officer, preferably one familiar with the situation and with a good knowledge of English (I was thinking of Foreign Minister Yeh’s candidate, Colonel I Fu-de, but did not mention his name), to proceed to Bangkok and start informal discussions [Page 102] with American and Thai representatives. In response to his question whether the Chinese representative would meet a Burmese officer, I replied that this might or might not be desirable, but that talks could be initiated with Thai and American representatives.

I went on to say that the Burmese seemed unwilling to order a cease-fire without assurances that the Chinese would then immediately take steps looking toward a withdrawal of Li Mi’s forces. The appointment of a Chinese representative and his despatch to Bangkok seemed the best way to get things started and to persuade the Burmese to stop military operations. I noted that the longer matters were delayed the greater would be the pressure from Li Mi’s men to obtain supplies, including ammunition, from the outside. To supply any of their needs from Formosa, in view of the undertakings of the Chinese Government here in Taipei and at the United Nations in New York, seemed to me most unwise, and I added that Admiral Radford agreed with me on this point. The facts would certainly become known and serious embarrassment for both our governments would result.

President Chiang replied with a laugh that there would be no suggestion of any such support for Li Mi coming from the Americans. I answered that whether we were directly blamed or not the effect would be the same, and that both of us must preserve appearances.

In conclusion the President said that he would consult with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense, and would let me have a reply as to the appointment of a Chinese representative to go to Bangkok.1

KLR
  1. On May 6, the Embassy reported that Col. I Fu-de was selected as the Chinese representative on the committee. Li Mi insisted that he could not assign a representative to the committee prior to a ceasefire, but Rankin thought Colonel I could make such informal contact with Li Mi’s representatives as might be necessary. (Telegram 1160; 690B.9321/5–653)