Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2

792.5/7–954

No. 430
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Thai and Malayan Affairs (Landon)

secret

Washington, July 9, 1954.

Subject:

• Defense Arrangements for Thailand.

Participants:

• The Secretary
• His Excellency Pote Sarasin, Ambassador of Thailand
• Kenneth P. Landon—PSA

[Here follows a portion of the memorandum of conversation printed in Part 1, page 612.]

At this point the Secretary changed the subject and inquired when the Thai Commander-in-Chief of the Armies, General Srisdi, would be leaving Washington, inquiring also whether General Smith had been able to get in touch with the Ambassador to suggest that General Srisdi remain a few days longer in order to make more specific arrangements with the Department of Defense.

The Thai Ambassador said that he had received the message through Mr. Drumright but had not been able to reach General Srisdi yet. Nevertheless, he gave assurance that General Srisdi would remain several days beyond the original schedule. He expressed great pleasure at the Secretary’s statement and asked as to the nature of the arrangements which might be reached.

The Secretary explained that the matter had been discussed in the Cabinet;¹ that the President had taken an active and personal interest in the matter; that Secretary Anderson’s staff would be working out details over the week-end and that it was expected that Secretary Anderson would be in a position on Monday to deal with the details of reinforcing the Thai Armed Forces.

The Secretary pointed out that he did not mean to raise Thailand’s hopes unduly as the Thai plans had achieved enlarged proportions beyond expectations; that the principal point right now was to get started on developing the reinforced Armed Forces of Thailand. Subsequent plans would be based on practical achievements.

The Thai Ambassador expressed great appreciation for this information and said that in his thinking a strong Thai Armed Force would achieve three objectives: (1) be prepared to defend Thailand; (2) be a deterrent to aggression; (3) be a real contributor to any collective defense arrangements for Southeast Asia.

As the Thai Ambassador was departing the Secretary instructed his secretary to inform Secretary Anderson’s office that General Srisdi would remain for a few days longer and would be available for conversations on Monday.²

The Thai Ambassador departed in a euphoric state.

1. According to the minutes of the Cabinet meeting on July 9, Secretary Dulles referred, during a report on the international situation, to the “pessimistic attitude of the Chief of Staff of Thailand who was returning to his country without securing the assistance requested. The President queried whether adequate administrative machinery existed for acting on these questions. Secretary Anderson explained that the Chief of Staff desired approval for a program greatly expanded at the last minute and that Defense was merely delaying decision, without rejecting the proposal, until adequate reports could be secured from the appropriate military advisory group. The President hoped that the Thailand Chief of Staff could be made to understand our sympathetic approach before his departure.” (Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file)
2. July 12.