State-JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417
No. 425
Memorandum on the Substance of
Discussions at a Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff
Meeting1
[Here follows a list of persons (25) present. The list includes Admiral Radford, Generals Nathan F. Twining, Chief of Staff of the Air Force; Matthew B. Ridgway, Chief of Staff of the Army; and [Page 719] Admiral Robert B. Carney, Chief of Naval Operations; Robert D. Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary of State; Lieutenant General Charles P. Cabell, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence; and S. Everett Gleason, Deputy Executive Secretary of the National Security Council. The meeting began with a brief discussion of United States relations with Pakistan.]
Mr. Murphy then raised the question of the aid program to Thailand referring to the possible development of a highway and increase in the Thai army, the development of a militia force and the construction of an air base in Northeastern Thailand. He asked Admiral Radford if the Joint Chiefs had formulated their views on these proposals.
Admiral Radford said a paper was being prepared for the Joint Chiefs which was not yet completed but their present thinking was as follows:
The Joint Chiefs did not favor the construction of an air base. In the first place, this would involve a substantial expenditure of money as elaborate concrete runways would have to be built. In the second place, bases in this location are not considered necessary from a military point of view.
General Twining confirmed Admiral Radford’s military estimate and pointed out that in view of the short distances, if Indochina were lost, such an air field would be literally under the guns of the enemy.
Admiral Radford also indicated that if we negotiated an agreement to construct an air base the next question that would be asked would be what are we going to use it for and in what circumstances. He implied there was no easy answer to this question.
With respect to the possible expansion of the Thailand army, Admiral Radford indicated that General Gilman had reported that it would take two years to train officers and NCO’s for the existing army of 60,000. Therefore, any larger force would be impractical at this time.…
. . . . . . .
With respect to the highway development, Admiral Radford stated this was an FOA project and that the Joint Chiefs would probably have no objection to its construction.
Mr. Landon referred to the possibility of developing the air base at Korat or to the construction of one considerably further south. He suggested that a base in the latter area might be less expensive, especially as the rainy season there was short.
Mr. Murphy said he thought Ambassador Donovan had discussed this when he was in Washington recently and that he had been [Page 720] under the impression the Air Force was interested in the possibility of building an air base in Thailand.
Admiral Radford said the Joint Chiefs felt certain that if the money was available to build another base a better location could be found. The JCS was just completing a study of Southeast Asia2 and if Indochina were lost they did not believe operations could be conducted from Burma to Thailand.
General Twining said he did not believe Mr. Landon’s point with respect to the possibility of constructing a less elaborate and cheaper base was sound since any base would have to be up-to-date and capable of handling jet aircraft. It would not be possible for the Air Force to do this on a shoe string.
In reply to a further question, Admiral Radford made it clear that when he was talking about these bases elsewhere he was not talking about one located in Southeast Asia.
[Here follows discussion relating to Guatemala and Indochina.]
- The source text bears the notation: “State Draft. Not cleared with any of participants.”↩
- Reference is presumably to a JCS memorandum of May 21 to the Secretary of Defense concerning the defense of Southeast Asia in the event of the loss of Indochina to the Communists; for text, see Part 1, p. 514.↩