Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2

790B.00/2–132: Telegram

No. 4
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State¹

top secret

London, February 1, 1952—6 p.m.

3357. Bangkok’s 1540, January 24² to Department repeated Taipei 12, Saigon 42, Rangoon 46, London unnumbered. I fully share concern expressed by Bangkok over explosive situation resulting from reports KMT troops in Burma contemplating further raids into Chinese Communist territory and hope Department can and will make strong representations to National Government, pointing out any nebulous and ephemeral advantages to be gained by further raids into Yunnan wld be far out-weighed by danger would probably ensue, not only to Burma but to whole western position in SEA.

Of particular concern to Embassy is persistence of rumors that, notwithstanding repeated denials by US authorities of official complicity, US nationals continue to be involved in supplying these KMT forces. Understood French have already brought to Department’s attention their embarrassment over practice of non-scheduled aircraft from Formosa, utilizing American pilots, refueling in Indochina en route to Bangkok. Other reports continue to flow in from Burma describing in detail alleged use of ports in Thailand as staging areas for logistical support of KMT forces. In light continuing reports of this kind, official US denials unaccompanied by US restraining action will continue to be ineffective.

In addition to representations already understood to have been made to Department by UK and French this subject it seems to me following aspect deserves most serious consideration. Although mere presence KMT forces in Burma and small-scale KMT raids from Burma into Yunnan will not in themselves invite Chinese Communist invasion of Burma, it would, of course, furnish ready-made pretext for such an invasion. When Chinese Communists and strategy dictates an invasion of SEA, it will be simple matter for them find or invent justification. What is more important is effect presence these forces on Asian nations. In case of Korea, fact that fifty nations denounced North Korean aggression³ was of immeasurable importance. In event of Chinese Communist aggression against Vietnam or Burma, it will be equally important to have largest possible measure of support. Unless KMT troop situation cleared up and rumors US’s complicity effectively proved without basis, it is likely Asian nations, especially India, will welcome this excuse for failure to join western powers in denouncing such aggression, and some of Vyshinsky’s mud will stick.

Gifford

1. Repeated to Bangkok, Taipei, Saigon, Rangoon, New Delhi, and Paris.
2. Telegram 1540, Jan. 18 (relayed to London on Jan. 24), described a conversation with the Chinese Chargé in Bangkok concerning reports that Gen. Li Mi was planning to return to Burma and begin new offensive operations. The telegram concluded: “As Dept knows, this matter has caused Emb deep concern, and I would like urge once again everything be done impress upon Nationalist Govt unwisdom Li Mi returning Thailand and more particularly the undertaking of any offensive operations from Burmese territory by KMT troops.” (793.00/1–1852)
3. Reference is presumably to Resolution 376 (V) of the U.N. General Assembly, Oct. 7, 1950; for text, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. vii, p. 904.