S/S files, lot 60 D 627, box 349
No. 375
United States Notes on the Meeting of
the United States-Philippine Council, Held at Malacanang Palace,
Manila, September 4, 19541
- American Representatives:
- Philippine Representatives:
- Vice President Garcia
- Secretary of Defense Cabahug
- Lt. Gen. Vargas
- Minister Neri
- Senator Pelaez
- Brig. Gen. Balao
- Brig. Gen. Cruz
- Brig. Gen. Arellano
- Commodore Francisco
- Capt. Pargas
The Council formally convened after a large group of photographers had completed their assignments.
Vice President Garcia, speaking without notes, made a very brief opening statement stating that what he was about to present to the American delegation was not new but had previously been presented to American officials in Washington by General Vargas. He concluded by presenting the document marked as Enclosure 2.6 Secretary Dulles then made his opening statement attached (Enclosure 3)7 and suggested a half hour adjournment in order to permit the American group to examine the Garcia document.
The session reconvened at 11:35 (other matters requiring the Secretary’s attention had come up which caused a slight delay). Secretary Dulles stated that the United States delegation had examined the document submitted by Secretary Garcia. He prefaced his comments on the substantive points, however, by explaining in considerable detail why it was not practicable for him at this time to [Page 630] make an executive agreement of the character envisioned by the Philippine delegation. He explained customary United States procedures in such negotiations and pointed out that there were certain points mentioned in the document which he believed we would be able to state we could favorably consider, other things which we would have to say we could not do and certain items in a middle ground where he could not take any firm position for the reason that he could not commit the Department of Defense. He explained at considerable length the problems arising out of allocations of funds under the Mutual Security Act and the difficulties faced by the Defense Department in distributing those funds in areas of danger among the free nations all of which were making requests similar to the Philippine Government. The Defense Department was therefore compelled to consider the total world situation before it could make specific commitments to particular countries.
Commenting on the substantive points which he noted were similar to points raised by General Vargas previously in Washington, the Secretary stated that he was in a position, however, to make some general statements as to the United States position and views. He stated that the United States was prepared to assist in the establishment of two full divisions and two training divisions of the Philippine Islands but was not prepared to make a comparative commitment on the naval and air arms of the Philippine armed forces. He pointed out that the United States had large naval and air forces in the area and wished to avoid the expense of duplicating these forces, but that we considered the building up of land forces most urgent and of a higher priority than the air and naval arms. He stated categorically that the United States was prepared to bear the cost of supplying the “hard goods” for these four divisions but at the present time he was not in a position to make any commitments as to “soft goods” although he said that the question of the supply of “soft goods” insofar as the Philippine foreign exchange position was concerned was being sympathetically considered by State and FOA.
Commenting on what we would do in the event of war, the Secretary remarked that he was not in a position to discuss specific details of this nature which was the responsibility of military representatives but he referred to his comments on our general responsibility toward the Philippines in his opening statement.
On the questions raised by the Philippine document as to offshore procurement, he pointed out that these could be dealt with only on a specific basis but that there was no objection on the part of the United States but even a desire to build up procurement of military supplies in offshore areas.
[Page 631]Commenting on industrial build-up, he made remarks of a similar tenor.
The Secretary spoke at some length on the interest to the Philippine Government in setting up consultative machinery, his general position being that he felt that there were already adequate facilities for consultation and that the United States did not desire to build up “machinery for the sake of having machinery” or to set up committees which would find themselves with nothing to do. He referred to the type of consultation which occurred when Secretary Wilson recently visited Manila and its fruitful results.
Secretary Garcia asked specifically what the United States could approve in the program and Secretary Dulles replied that he could go no farther in the way of firm commitments than that embodied in the promise of support for the four divisions, but this did not mean that everything else was excluded, and he suggested that a communiqué be issued in the afternoon which would cover the area on which agreement was reached and the areas which would be kept under study.
Admiral Stump, in commenting on the question of liaison, referred to the record of frank and honest conferences between the military services of the two countries and that he was prepared to come to see General Vargas or have General Vargas come to Honolulu for consultation at any time and he indicated he thought present procedures adequate for liaison problems. He added that it was the position of the Department of Defense that the Philippine Government should bear the cost of the armed forces other than the expense of the hard goods.
Secretary Garcia, in commenting on the request for assistance, also dwelt at considerable length on the Philippine desire for a build-up of its naval and air arms. It was quite apparent that Secretary Garcia was interested in these matters with a view to having something which would be visible to the general public. Secretary of Defense Cabahug made no statements whatever during the entire meeting.
General Vargas spoke with great earnestness on his interest in the development of the air and naval arms and on the need of convincing the Philippine people that the Philippine Government had something of its own. He dwelt on the effect of morale in the Philippine armed forces and emphasized that the Philippine economy could not support even the supply of soft goods for the armoured divisions, remarking that if the Philippine Government could not get air and navy support, they might not see the necessity of increasing the ground forces. The Secretary, in reply to General Vargas, said that he was entirely sympathetic to his point of view but that the enemy operated on internal lines and if the free nations [Page 632] attempted to maintain sufficient strength at all points of possible attack there was simply not enough strength to go around.
Following General Vargas’ remarks, the Secretary pointed out that the suggested Philippine program looked forward several years and that the United States could not as a practical matter commit itself except on an annual basis, but that the Filipinos need not conclude that there was no possibility of a build-up in their strength. He emphasized that the United States feeling was that the major effort should be in terms of a build-up of a land force for this year, and for the time being at least, primary dependence in the area should be placed on United States sea and air forces.
In commenting on General Vargas’ statement that the Philippine economy could not stand the cost of maintaining ground forces, the Secretary remarked that a similar problem existed in the United States and pointed out that during the coming Congressional campaign the Administration could expect to be criticized for not being able to balance the budget and that all of this involves sacrifices which would have to be borne as long as the danger existed but that the United States was making sacrifices and was giving increased priority to the Philippines in our scheme of things.
Secretary Neri spoke briefly stating he was impressed by the United States appraisal of the situation and could find no cause to differ on any basic matter but he wanted to speak frankly on these matters in the light of the coming SEATO Conference.8 He thought a build-up of the Philippine armed forces would be an important consideration in that Conference because the Philippines had been held up in Asia as a model in handling the Communist problem and he made an appeal for support of their proposals for the effect it would have on President Magsaysay. Secretary Garcia, just before adjournment, made an effort to get the Secretary to spell out specifically what he could approve, what he could not approve, and what would be given sympathetic consideration, but the Secretary reiterated that he could not commit himself more than he had done, reminding the Philippine Delegation that he could not speak for the Department of Defense.
Just before the close of the meeting Secretary Garcia again made a strong plea for concessions, particularly on strengthening the air force, basing his arguments largely on morale factors and remarking that the Filipinos feared that in the event of war United States air strength might be diverted to some other area. The Secretary suggested that the technical staff should get together for further [Page 633] discussions but General Vargas took the position that in view of announced decisions no further staff work could produce anything and decisions were now required. Secretary Dulles disagreed with this position but the conference adjourned at 12:50 with the understanding that during the luncheon period a communiqué would be prepared.
Afternoon session
The Conference was originally scheduled to reconvene at 3:00 p.m. but Secretary Garcia sent word that the Philippine delegation would not be ready to meet until 3:30. About 3:45 President Magsaysay, accompanied only by General Romulo, came to the American delegation room and said the Philippine group was very unhappy over failure to mention the supply of soft goods in the draft of the joint communiqué which had been prepared by the American staff following the adjournment in the morning.9 He mentioned also the omission of any promise or implication that the United States would assist in strengthening the Philippine naval and air forces. President Magsaysay was anxious to have something inserted in the communiqué which would offer some encouragement at least to the Philippines on these two points. Secretary Dulles explained again, as he had explained to Secretary Garcia in the morning session, the difficulties of accommodating the Filipinos in this respect. Certain minor changes, however, were inserted in the communiqué which were apparently acceptable to President Magsaysay and he then took the revised draft back to his delegation. He brought the paper back a few minutes later, this time accompanied by Romulo and Neri and one or two minor modifications were again made and the paper taken back to the Philippine caucus room. However, it was not until 5:20 that the Council was reconvened to approve formally the communiqué finally released (Enclosure 4). Before that time Secretary Dulles had to leave the building on other business and Ambassador Sebald, in his absence, agreed verbally with Secretary Garcia that the communiqué as finally drafted was satisfactory to both sides. After an exchange of the usual amenities the meeting finally adjourned at 5:25.
It was significant that neither Garcia nor any of the Philippine military personnel appeared on the scene after the adjournment of the morning session. It seems quite clear that President Magsaysay took the matter into his own hands and decided that it was the part of wisdom for the Philippine Government to accept without further quibbling what the United States Government was prepared to offer.
[Page 634]- The notes give no indication of authorship, but the brief covering despatch which transmitted them to the Department as Enclosure 1 was drafted by Ely. (Despatch 245 from Manila, Sept. 21; 796.5 MSP/9–2154).↩
- William J. Sebald, Ambassador in Burma, became Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs on Nov. 1, 1954.↩
- Senator H. Alexander Smith of New Jersey, Chairman of the Subcommittee on the Far East of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.↩
- Henry Suydam, Chief of the News Division, Department of State.↩
- Richard R. Ely, Attaché at the Embassy in Manila.↩
- Not printed. The document was a draft Philippine proposal for an executive agreement on implementation of the U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty. It called for U.S. aid to the Philippine Army, Navy, and Air Force, both in hardware and soft goods, economic and financial aid, assistance to civil defense, dollar grants to enlarge Philippine industrial facilities, and placing of off-shore procurement orders in the Philippines, among other things.↩
- Not printed. In it, Dulles stated that the United States would honor its treaty commitments by acting automatically and immediately in the event of aggression against the Philippines.↩
- For documentation on the SEATO Conference, held September 6–8 at Manila, see Part 1, pp. 835 ff.↩
- Not printed.↩
- The note was forwarded under date of Sept. 7. (Enclosure 5 to despatch 245 from Manila)↩