Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2

796.5 MSP/5–2554: Telegram

No. 364
The Chargé in the Philippines (Lacy) to the Department of State

secret

Manila, May 25, 1954—6 p.m.

2665. Pass Defense. Secretary Wilson, Under Secretary Gates,¹ Admiral Stump,² Admiral Goodwin,³ Admiral Storrs,⁴ General Cannon and I met at Sangley Point evening 24 May to discuss meeting today with Magsaysay. It was consensus that:

(a) Secretary Defense should not and could not commit US to program of character described in General Cannon’s memo Embtel 2635 May 21;

(b) Nonetheless conversations with Magsaysay should be reassuring as to US desire and determination perform under 1951 treaty and that release made at end of meeting should be noncommittal but provide Magsaysay’s opposition with as little ground for criticism as possible to the effect Magsaysay had been shortchanged by US;

(c) In order limited nature Secretary Defense assurances to Magsaysay not leak, discussion matters of moment be undertaken by Secretary Defense and Magsaysay alone (if Secretary Defense had asked for one or more advisers to be present Magsaysay would obviously have been obliged do likewise).

During course discussions Magsaysay sent me following memo which he classified as Top Secret:

“Agenda matters to be taken up with Secretary Wilson regarding the implementation of the United States-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty. This has been prepared for submission to the United States Secretary of Defense, the Honorable Chas. Wilson, on the basis of information that he has expressed willingness discuss the various matters contained in it with President Magsaysay during his visit Manila. Renewal of open Communist aggression in the immediate neighborhood of the Philippines in Asia, in which attempt the Communists have apparently met with initial success, has caused great concern on the part of the government and the Filipino people. This feeling has given rise to the need on their part for more definite assurance from the United States with which they have entered into a formal agreement of mutual defense and on which, because of the prevailing international situation, they have to rely for assistance in case of external attack. This concern is based on their experience in the last world war. It is imperative that their feeling of security be restored and it is believed that this could be accomplished if a more definite clarification of the commitments of the US under the aforementioned treaty could be had, especially as such commitments may apply directly and specifically to the threat posed by the recent Communist gains in Indochina.

Despite the limitations in material resources from which the Philippines as a young nation as yet suffers, not to mention its other equally important and pressing preoccupations connected with nation building, it is prepared to fulfill its own commitments under the treaty. For this reason it is desirous of improving its present defense capabilities. And it is believed that the Philippines could more fully and effectively live up to its obligations under the aforementioned covenant if the United States Government could favorably entertain the following proposals:

1. To effectively carry out the terms of the Mutual Defense Treaty, which developments in the international situation especially in the Far East obviously call for, it is proposed that a council be created to be composed of representatives of the US and the Philippines. This group will serve as a continuing body in charge of the over-all implementation of the above-mentioned pact in the same manner as that provided for in the bilateral defense treaty entered into by the US with Australia and New Zealand.

2. Build-up of Philippine military manpower.

The Philippines has sufficient manpower. To enable this country to do its part in repelling external aggression and take care of its own internal security, the use of this manpower is believed urgently called for to augment and bolster the existing military, naval and air forces. Training can begin by phases, starting with at least one division. The United States Government, however, will have to underwrite expenses such as those for equipment, cantonment areas and pay.

3. Participation in marginal wars.

To take care of this contingency, it is proposed recruit and train a body of volunteer reserves and trainee reserves which, should the need arise for their employment under the military bases agreement, could be used without violating certain requirements under the Philippine constitution and laws. Experience with the United States recruitment program under the military bases agreement and in connection with Philippine participation in the United Nations’ military action in Korea has shown that this proposal is feasible and practical.

4. Increased economic assistance.

Notwithstanding the generous amounts received by the Philippines in military assistance, the Philippine Government still found it necessary to appropriate funds. It is therefore necessary that the United States Government, to forestall any adverse effect which these military outlays may have on the national economic structure, give sympathetic consideration to the following:

a. The use of the Philippines more fully as an off-shore procurement base for war materials, supplies, and war services for United States and Allied forces in Southeast Asia. This would mean increasing our dollar reserves and relieving in some measure our present unemployment situation. Given sufficient dollar assistance toward the purchase of needed machinery, the Philippines can supply the United States and her Southeast Asian allies the following services:

(1) Repair and maintenance of aircraft engines;

(2) Manufacture of sheet metal products;

(3) Repair of vessels;

(4) Manufacture of individual clothing and equipment;

(5) Manufacture of tentages and other canvas equipment;

(6) Repair and rehabilitation to include assembly of motor vehicles;

(7) Manufacture of small arms and equipment.

b. United States purchase of Philippine bonds for rural development.

c. The up-dating of the Bell Trade Act.

d. Use of the good offices of the United States Government to settle the Japanese reparation question in a manner satisfactory to the Philippines.

e. Increased FOA assistance.

If the foregoing proposals are acceptable to the United States Government, it is suggested that a joint committee be created composed of representatives of the two countries to discuss and agree on the preliminary details thereof.”

It was agreed that Secretary Defense could give Magsaysay no satisfaction on any of enumerated paragraphs except number one. Accordingly a press release was drafted differing in no important respect from that which is dispatched as UMPHE 06250800Z.⁵

After luncheon 25 May Secretary Defense and Magsaysay adjourned to latter’s private apartments where press release UMPHE 06250800Z and Magsaysay memorandum were discussed. After some thirty minutes Admiral Stump and I were asked to join the two and press release with minor changes agreed upon. Secretary Defense made clear to Magsaysay that remaining matters Magsaysay memo were to be held between the two of them and would be dealt with at another time in some appropriate way.

Secretary Defense, Admiral Stump, Magsaysay, Cannon and I consider press release best possible under circumstances. Magsaysay seems satisfied and reasonably confident that he will not be subjected to damaging attack from opposition, which remains to be seen.

Secretary Defense established unusually sympathetic relations Magsaysay.

Lacy

1. Thomas S. Gates, Jr., Under Secretary of the Navy.
2. Adm. Felix B. Stump, Commander in Chief, Pacific, and U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPAC/CINCPAC FLT).
3. Rear Adm. Hugh H. Goodwin, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Philippines (COMNAVPHIL), since May 1, 1954.
4. Rear Adm. Aaron P. Storrs, III, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Pacific.
5. Not printed. The press release expressed agreement on the establishment of a joint U.S.-Philippine Council to hold discussions under Article III of the Mutual Defense Treaty.