Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2

S/P–NSC files, lot 61 D 167, NSC 84 Series

No. 351
Memorandum Prepared by the Department of State for the National Security Council Planning Board¹

top secret

Washington, January 14, 1954.

Current Situation In The Philippines

Purpose

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to describe the situation in the Philippines after the election of last November in terms of (a) the domestic problems facing the new President, (b) the current unsettled matters in U.S.-Philippine relations, (c) the possible expanded role in Southeast Asia of the Philippines under Magsaysay’s leadership, and (d) the opportunities and courses of action open to the United States in order to advance U.S. interests in the Philippines and in Southeast Asia. The memorandum should be read in the light of the objectives and courses of action contained in NSC 84/2 of November 9, 1950 which are as follows:

“27. The United States has as its objectives in the Philippines the establishment and maintenance of:

a. An effective government which will preserve and strengthen the pro-U.S. orientation of the people.

b. A Philippine military capability of restoring and maintaining internal security.

c. A stable and self-supporting economy.

“28. To accomplish the above objectives, the United States should:

a. Persuade the Philippine Government to effect political, financial, economic and agricultural reforms in order to improve the stability of the country.

b. Provide such military guidance and assistance as may be deemed advisable by the United States and acceptable to the Philippine Government.

c. Extend, under United States supervision and control, appropriate economic assistance in the degree corresponding to progress made toward creating the essential conditions of internal stability.

d. Continue to assume responsibility for the external defense of the Islands and be prepared to commit United States forces, if necessary, to prevent communist control of the Philippines.”

(It will be observed that the above objectives and courses of action relate purely to internal Philippine affairs and make no reference to the role of leadership which it is hoped the Philippines will play in Southeast Asia nor do they take into account the relations established between the United States and the Philippines in the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1952.)²

The Philippine Elections of November 10, 1953.

[Here follows a review of the elections, problems facing the Philippine Government, and current issues in United States-Philippine relations.]

united states courses of action

Rural Development.

28. The United States should lend vigorous support to any realistic program to eliminate the social and economic causes of Communism. Although not yet set forth in detail, the new Administration’s program may be expected to include such matters as vigorous enforcement of land tenure laws, accelerated issuance of land title certificates, improvement and extension of rural credit facilities and of agricultural education and construction of safe water supplies and irrigation systems. It is highly desirable that an FOA program be provided for fiscal year 1955 to aid the new Administration in achieving its objectives in the field of social and economic development, by not only maintaining FOA activities at previous levels but also enabling FOA to take advantage of fresh opportunities for cooperation which may be anticipated as a result of the expected vigorous attack of the Magsaysay administration on these problems.

Military Assistance.

29. U.S. Military aid, training and advice, which have played a large role in the successful campaign against the Hukbalahap, should be continued to eliminate the few thousand armed communists still active and to continue development of armed forces to improve their ability to resist any external attack.

Development of Democracy.

30. Efforts by other government agencies to strengthen basic democratic procedures and attitudes through civic organizations should be continued with emphasis on the development of popular understanding of the rights and responsibilities of the citizen under a democratic government. Such a program, based on long-term objectives and not on immediate political goals, would contribute to political stability and strengthen any Philippine Government acting in the best interests of the people.

Philippine Role in East and Southeast Asia.

31. Magsaysay’s personal qualifications justify the hope that he may develop as a leader of the anti-Communist forces in East and Southeast Asia. The United States should favor and support such a development while realizing, of course, that cultural and political conditions and the current foreign policy views of some of the countries of East and Southeast Asia indicate the existence in the area of many factors tending toward disunity rather than toward cohesiveness. These obstacles, although substantial, are not in the long run insurmountable.

32. There is general agreement that Magsaysay should devote his energies to a successful attack on Philippine domestic problems before embarking on any full scale program to achieve the leadership of anti-Communist elements in the general area. In the meantime he should be encouraged to take the following immediate steps to lay a firm international base upon which to build at a later date:

a. The Philippines should recognize the Associated States of Indochina at the earliest possible moment and establish good working relations at least with the Government of Vietnam.

b. Assignments to Philippine diplomatic posts in East and Southeast Asian countries should be given special attention to insure the best possible Philippine representation.

c. Every effort should be made to arrive at a realistic solution of the dispute with Japan concerning reparations so that relations between the two countries may be established on a normal basis without delay.

d. Magsaysay should be asked to do what he can in order to improve the state of public opinion in the Philippines with regard to Syngman Rhee and Chiang Kai-shek. There is a tendency in Philippine public opinion to regard these men as autocratic dictators and as symbols of outworn and discredited leadership.

33. Simultaneously with these steps the Department should ask our Embassies in the other countries of East and Southeast Asia to prepare recommendations as to how relations between the Philippines and these countries may be improved and developed. These recommendations, which should reflect the views of all agencies concerned, would be conveyed to Ambassador Spruance for his information, comments, and guidance.…

34. The rapid and successful disposition of pending United States-Philippine issues, notably the bases matter and the trade agreement, in a manner fair to Philippine aspirations would also be helpful in laying a foundation for Magsaysay to assume a role of leadership in Southeast Asia.

35. Once Magsaysay has sufficiently consolidated his position in the Philippines and it appears that his administration is well on its way to fulfilling the promise on the basis of which he was elected, consideration should be given to the next steps in the development of his leadership. These steps would include the following:

a. A visit by Magsaysay to the United States including, if possible, an address before both Houses of Congress. The timing of such a visit vis-à-vis visits to other Southeast Asian countries would depend on conditions prevailing at the time.

b. Contact between Magsaysay and the leaders of other East and Southeast Asian countries. These contacts should, if possible, develop through the normal diplomatic channels of the countries concerned. Magsaysay might visit some of the countries and receive visits from their leaders. A carefully considered program based on conditions prevailing at the time should be developed. If Magsaysay is to be a symbol of the war against Communism he should make his first visit to the battle fronts in Indochina and assure the Vietnamese soldiers and the troops of the French union of the solidarity of the people of the Philippines in their struggle.

c. It is also desirable that relations between the Philippines and Australia and New Zealand be improved. There exists considerable prejudice in the Philippines at the present time against Australia and New Zealand because of Australian racial policy. Nevertheless, the realization that all three countries are faced with a common threat and may well find themselves fighting side by side would contribute to better relations. An invitation from the Australian Government for Magsaysay to visit Australia might aid in the attainment of this objective, but must be considered in the light of its effect on opinion in Southeast Asia.

d. Once the necessary groundwork has been laid, Magsaysay might consider calling a conference of certain Asian countries to examine regional, political, military, and economic defense problems.

Possible Revision of NSC 84/2.

36. The broad objectives of United States policy and the course of action recommended to achieve those objectives as set forth in NSC 84/2 remain unchanged except for paragraph 28–d referring to the external defense of the Philippines which should be revised to take into consideration the Mutual Defense Treaty of August 1952. In several instances the description of conditions extant in the Philippines has become obsolete since NSC 84/2 was approved November 9, 1950. These paragraphs should be revised or amended to reflect current conditions as soon as the Magsaysay administration has determined its course of action and made a beginning toward carrying out the promises of the 1953 electoral campaign. Amendments might also include a reference to the possibility of Magsaysay assuming leadership of the anti-Communist elements of Southeast Asia and should emphasize the necessity of avoiding the appearance of United States control or excessive influence on the Philippine President or Government.

MDAP Expenditures

(Millions of dollars)

	Economic Aid	Technical Assistance	Military Aid2
1951	—	—	8.9
1952	12.0	—	11.2
1953	22.5	1.6	33.8
1954 Estimated	16.8	5.2	—3
1955 Estimated	16.1	3.9	—3
1956 Estimated	15.0		—3

1. A copy of the memorandum was sent to Manila under cover of airgram 287, Feb. 3. The Embassy’s comments are contained in Document 354.
2. The Mutual Defense Treaty was signed on Aug. 30, 1951, and entered into force on Aug. 27, 1952.
2. Value of items shipped to Philippines. [Footnote in the source text.]
3. Not available on a country basis. [Footnote in the source text.]
3. Not available on a country basis. [Footnote in the source text.]
3. Not available on a country basis. [Footnote in the source text.]