Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2

796.00/11–953

No. 341
Memorandum for the Secretary of State

secret

Washington, 9 November 1953.

Subject:

• … Possible Armed Revolt in the Philippines.

1. At the time of Ambassador Spruance’s presence in Washington during the forepart of October, he reported his concern over the fact that Magsaysay and certain of his supporters were talking quite freely about the possibility of an armed insurrection in the event the elections were to be lost as a result of fraud and intimidation on the part of Quirino and his supporters. This problem was the subject of several discussions which were participated in by Ambassador Spruance and representatives of the Department of State …¹ and it was the unanimous view that all reasonable and feasible steps should be taken to deter Magsaysay and his supporters from unconstitutional activities and to persuade them to refrain from any further discussions or threats of resorting to such activities.

2. During the latter part of October … a number of reports … indicated that Magsaysay and some of his close supporters for his candidacy as President of the Philippines were planning for the possibility of armed revolt in the event that President Quirino should “steal” the election by conspicuous fraud and violence. Some of the reports indicated that certain of the more irresponsible of Magsaysay’s supporters, including Senator Laurel, were actually making physical preparations for such armed action.

. . . . . . .

4. On 6 November … reported that Magsaysay and Nacionalista Senator Puyat had requested a secret meeting with the United States Ambassador to seek confirmation of the United States policy position in the event that President Quirino “stole” the election with conspicuous fraud and violence. The Ambassador had agreed to meet with Magsaysay and Puyat .…

5. On 8 November … reported that the meeting had been held … with Magsaysay, Senator Puyat, Ambassador Spruance, Counselor of the Embassy Lacy … in attendance. The report stated that Magsaysay gave firm assurances that he would take no armed action and that he was able to control all his partisans in this matter. He went on to say that if Quirino received an apparent plurality of the vote through massive fraud and terrorism, he was confident the Nacionalistas could gain majority support in Congress to prevent the confirmation of Quirino and to declare Magsaysay President. Magsaysay said he would then promptly relieve General Duque as Chief of Staff and appoint General Vargas in his place. Magsaysay hoped that with such Congressional and Army backing he could establish a stable government, meeting the requirements for United States recognition, which would be needed as soon as possible.

. . . . . . .

1. No record of these discussions has been found in Department of State files.