Office of the Historian

690B.9321/1–3053: Telegram

No. 32
The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China1

top secret
Washington, January 30, 1953—7:49 p.m.

524. Eyes only Mission Chiefs. In light recent reports from Rangoon, Dept convinced that despite disadvantage direct US involvement, US Govt must make vigorous attempt eliminate explosive situation resulting presence Chinese Nationalist troops in Burma. To accomplish this objective following course of action has been decided upon, after consultation with Defense.…

1.
After appropriate groundwork you are to seek interview with Pres Chiang and convey to him strong view US Govt that activities of Chinese Nationalist troops in Burma constitute serious threat to security and a disruptive influence not only in Burma but throughout Southeast Asia; that while US Govt understands and sympathizes with Chinese Govt desire to support Chi peoples’ resistance to Commie oppression on mainland, it cannot condone activities Chi troops in Burma which are being carried on at expense security free nations and which in any event are not contributing tangibly to such resistance; that US Govt therefore most anxious that steps be taken terminate activities Chi Natl troops on Burma soil and permit troops return Taiwan; and that to this end, knowing [Page 49] that Pres Chiang fully shares its desire to strengthen sovereignty of newly independent states and support measures for stability necessary for evolution independent states in area, US Govt desires make proposals for solution of problem.
2.
In conversation with President Chiang you may inform him general nature proposals under consideration which now envisage evacuation via Thailand in preference Rangoon. Steps suggested if Chiang agrees to plan in principle are summarized below.
a.
Chiang to inform Li Mi of plan and obtain all information necessary assure maximum compliance orders to troops.
b.
Emb Rangoon to inform Burmese Govt Chiang willing order KMT troops leave Burma and US Govt prepared use good offices facilitate arrangements transportation to Formosa. If reaction favorable Emb Rangoon to seek Burmese concurrence evacuation via Thailand or failing that via Rangoon.
c.
If Burmese Govt agrees Thai route US Emb Bangkok to make informal approach to Thai Govt. If prospects favorable formal request to be made by Chinese Nationalist Govt.
d.
If Thai Govt unwilling, means by which US and Chi Nationalist Govt could assist in evacuation via Rangoon to be discussed with Burmese and Chinese Nationalist Govt.
e.
Details of evacuation scheme to be worked out by Burmese, Chi Nationalist and Thai Govts with US assistance.
f.
On completion detailed arrangements Pres Chiang to direct General Li Mi to order his troops to report to designated place and lay down their arms after which troops to be given full instructions arrangements departure Burma.
g.
If leaving via Thailand troops would travel overland by road and rail; if via Rangoon airlift may be necessary but possibility using US aircraft must not be mentioned in discussions owing uncertainty availability. Chinese Nationalist Govt would be expected furnish sea transport from Bangkok or Rangoon.
3.
Dept hopes preliminary steps recognized as necessary in preparation for interview will not entail very long delay and Pres Chiang can be persuaded to agree to plan at least in principle. This agreement appears necessary before answers can be sought to such questions as how operation is to be financed and transportation provided. Question of disposition of arms of KMT troops recognized as one on which US Govt might have to seek solution acceptable authorities and troops.
4.
Outline of proposed steps being airmailed.
5.
Interested agencies concur foregoing plan and appropriate instructions being sent … to assure full coordination all action taken pursuance these instructions. Defense requests you inform Army Attaché.…
Matthews
  1. Repeated to Rangoon and Bangkok.↩