Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2

756C.00/11–1054

No. 298
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Western European Affairs (Jones)

confidential

Washington, November 10, 1954.

Subject:

• West New Guinea

Participants:

• The Secretary
• Dr. van Roijen, The Netherlands Ambassador
• John Wesley Jones, WE

The Netherlands Ambassador called today at his request to present the Secretary with the first draft of a UN resolution on West New Guinea prepared by the Netherlands and Australia (see attachment).¹ The Ambassador said that the draft resolution had been approved by the Netherlands cabinet and would, he anticipated, be introduced into the UN by some third country acting as sponsor. His Government very much hoped that the United States would find it possible to support this resolution and vote for it.

Dr. van Roijen drew the Secretary’s attention to the fourth paragraph of the Preamble and the fourth paragraph of the Resolution, itself, which confirm the willingness of the Netherlands Government to give the inhabitants of West New Guinea the opportunity to determine their own future. He said that he hoped that the positive aspects of the Netherlands-Australian draft would appeal to the U.S. Government as well as those of other member states of the UN.

The Secretary asked whether the Indonesian Government would favor a resolution such as that drafted by the Netherlands and Australia or whether that Government intended to introduce a resolution of its own. The Ambassador replied that the Indonesia Government, he understood, had different ideas; that its resolution would probably call for negotiations between the Netherlands and Indonesia thus emphasizing the necessity for settlement of a dispute which the Netherlands Government cannot admit is required.²

The Secretary asked what chance of success the Indonesian resolution might have and the Ambassador referred to the unresolved question of voting on this matter by two-thirds or by a simple majority which will, of course, have a significant effect upon the outcome of the voting on any resolution related to this issue.

The Secretary said that we were, of course, very anxious that certain of these areas not pass into Communist hands and, turning to a map of the Pacific, he pointed to the chain of strategic islands which ran from the Aleutians down through Japan, Formosa, and the Philippines, to New Guinea and Australia. He said that there were other areas which we also were most anxious should not fall to the Communist side. This, he continued, was the basis for our policy that we do nothing to push the Government of Indonesia off its delicate balance on to the wrong side, particularly in the light of recent indications that the political situation in Djakarta was, from the standpoint of the West, improving and in the light of the forthcoming national elections. After very careful soul-searching the U.S. Government had decided that it must continue to maintain its policy of strict neutrality in this New Guinea question although admittedly this was not a glorious posture. Certainly if only the welfare of the inhabitants of West New Guinea were concerned we would have to admit that development toward ultimate political self-determination would be better assured under the present rule. However, the Secretary concluded, there were many other important factors involved and, for the political considerations referred to above, he felt that we must maintain our neutral policy in this particular issue. The Ambassador replied that he knew his Government would be disappointed but that he would do his best to explain to it the Secretary’s reasons for this decision.³

1. Not printed. This draft resolution was not formally presented to the U.N. General Assembly.
2. An Indonesian resolution along the lines indicated was presented subsequently to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly as U.N. document A/C.1/L.109, but was not pressed to a vote.
3. In a subsequent memorandum of Nov. 12 to Secretary Dulles, Jones stated that the Netherlands Ambassador had transmitted his government’s disappointment at the U.S. position, conveyed after he had informed it of his talk with Dulles. The Netherlands Government wished to emphasize that, in its opinion, a vote in favor of the Netherlands-Australian resolution could not be construed as procolonial in view of the resolution’s explicit provision for ultimate self-determination by the indigenous population. (656.56C13/11–1254)