Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2

711.55356D/10–1354: Telegram

No. 296
The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Indonesia

secret

Washington, October 13, 1954.¹

477. Ambassador Cumming in conversation Foreign Minister Sunario recalled genesis program which resulted U.S. agreement transport Indonesian military trainees. Said now learned that for reasons unknown but presumably at direction Minister Defense, Indonesia failing nominate sufficient officers fill allocated training spaces.

Ambassador said this caused him embarrassment in view strong representations he had made. Sunario promised take up with Prime Minister on return Indonesia next week and said he appreciated failure utilize training allocated would “help those American quarters who continually charge Indonesia was Communist”.²

Hoover

1. The time of transmission is not legible on the source text.

2. On Nov. 12, Chargé John M. Steeves talked with Foreign Minister Sunario about several topics affecting U.S.-Indonesian relations. The concluding portion of Steeves’ memorandum of conversation, sent to the Department on Nov. 16, reads as follows:

   “The Foreign Minister again referred to how difficult it was to pursue a strictly independent policy and not have it misunderstood by the United States as a soft attitude towards Communism. It seemed to me that the occasion was ripe for a positive suggestion to the Foreign Minister, and I told him that I thought that one thing that would help would be for Indonesia to exhibit a little more real neutrality in the public utterances of its leaders. In recalling the fact that we had had several conversations recently about his concern over adverse comment in the United States press on affairs in Indonesia, I said that some of the current utterances by the President and the Prime Minister were likely to be misunderstood in the United States and produce a further spate of the very type of comment he wished to avoid. I pointed out to him that some Americans felt that a truly neutral policy did not consist in reminding the Indonesian people from the public platform that Indonesia was not going to succumb to American blandishments and in a variety of ways insinuate that America was the power to be feared and that keeping the U.S. at arm’s length was the essence of neutrality. I told him that I thought Indonesian spokesmen could do much to allay the fears of those who claimed that Indonesia was moving in the direction of the Communist world if they would a little more openly give assurances that they were not under the spell of Communist China or if they were a little less afraid to criticize the Soviets. He took the suggestion very well and said that maybe they had been remiss, and he would give this some definite thought.” (Enclosure to despatch 263; 756D.00/11–1654)