Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2

656.56D13/8–1854: Telegram

No. 291
The Ambassador in Indonesia (Cumming) to the Department of State¹

secret

Djakarta, August 18, 1954—1 p.m.

292. Re The Hague telegram sent Department 250, repeated Djakarta 14, Canberra unnumbered.² I would like to state for the record that I do not believe Department or this Embassy have neglected any step short of a public statement or a formal démarche to make clear to Indos our views re inclusion of New Guinea item on GA agenda. I have taken every opportunity to make clear in unmistakable terms to President Sukarno, Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and other Foreign Office officials US views on this matter. Always however within framework of our policy of hands off or neutrality with respect to Dutch-Indo dispute. I have emphasized that if Indo persisted in its purported plan to seek UNGA consideration US, despite its desire to stay out of the problem, might be required, thereby to take a position. I know that Indo officials have well understood by implication that if the US had to take a position it might be one contrary to Indo wishes. It is, I am sure, Indo’s clear understanding of the portent of my various remarks that has led Foreign Office officials to express the hope (reported in previous telegrams) that if US could not support Indo position we might at least refrain from supporting Dutch position by lobbying against the Indo proposal if it should be made. While we have not succeeded in scotching the project, I am sure that our representations have played a part in compelling the Indos to moderate, at least in their own eyes, the nature of their proposal. (Mytel 263.)³

Sukarno from outset has been the prime leader in all moves to bring Irian problem to a head. There is no Indo party which does not subscribe to belief that Irian is by rights Indonesian. Most leaders have, however, felt that it was not expedient or wise to press forward as rapidly as Sukarno desired or as his patriotic demagoguery on the subject required; on the other hand no leader or party could afford to be placed in a position of open opposition to steps proposed by Sukarno “to complete the revolution by regaining Irian.”

Even the most reasonable Indo leaders with whom I have talked, firmly believe that it is Dutch refusal even to discuss the question which has forced Sukarno equally firmly to insist upon discussion.

As I stated in the final paragraph mytel 263 US support of an Indo resolution calling on the two parties to get together and report the results to GA would be beneficial to US position in Indo and perhaps other ex-colonial areas. I do not mean by this, however, that such support would contribute significantly in the immediate future to furthering our policy objectives in this area; it would produce at best only some general warming of public and official opinion towards US.

Given our hands off attitude towards the Irian dispute, with which I heartily agree, I think either of the following courses of action would do us the least harm and perhaps some good in Indo: (1) Vote for the inclusion of the item on the agenda but abstain from any vote in GA itself, or (2) abstain from voting on any phase of the question. A sine qua non of preserving Indo friendly understanding if not acceptance of US position is that we carefully refrain from lobbying for or against either the Dutch or the Indo position.

I do not see how in the light of our alliances with the Dutch and with the Aussies we can give “any favorable nod” to the Indos; on the other hand, in view of the present and future importance of Indo to American security interests in Southeast Asia, I do not see how we can give a favorable nod to the Dutch.⁴

Cumming

1. Repeated to The Hague, Canberra, and London.
2. In telegram 250, Aug. 13, Ambassador Matthews expressed regret that the “Department for whatever valid reasons, did not make our opposition to inclusion of [Netherlands New Guinea] item on [U.N. General Assembly] agenda clear to Indos earlier.” (656.56D13/8–1354)
3. Telegram 263, Aug. 12, stated that the Indonesian Cabinet had approved a resolution calling for discussions with the Netherlands rather than a resolution calling for the recognition by the General Assembly of Indonesia’s claim to Western New Guinea, partially in the hope that the United States would be able to support the former proposal. (656.56D13/8–1254)

4. On Aug. 26, the Embassy in Djakarta commented further:

   “Embtel 292. In response to a question, Foreign Minister Sunario told Ambassador Cumming that he (Cumming) had made clear to President, Prime Minister, and himself, US attitude on wisdom of introducing West New Guinea problem in UNGA, but that Irian was ‘national problem’ and that they had been forced to proceed.” (Telegram 346; 656.56D13/8–2654)