Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2

493.56D9/7–1654: Telegram

No. 282
The Ambassador in Indonesia (Cumming) to the Department of State

secret
priority

Djakarta, July 16, 1954—6 p.m.

113. Joint Embassy-USOM message. Following Jones’ arrival we have undertaken a joint re-examination of the whole situation created by the prospect of Indonesian rubber sales to Red China. We are agreed that the considerations set forth in my telegram 72 [27]¹ are still valid. Deptels 39 and especially 50² encourage us to believe that Department and FOA/W share our view that if at all possible we should avoid taking a position ourselves from which there could be no retreat and which would force us to halt US aid to Indonesia if the Pulaski actually sails to a Red Chinese port. The following thoughts are predicated on this assumption and on the further assumption that some initiative should be taken by our side to assist the Indonesians from taking a position from which they cannot recede.

It will be clear to Department from my reports of the past few days that practically all political elements (there have been only three Indonesian newspapers which have expressed the contrary position) are already reacting unfavorably to what the press terms “punishment” by US for violation UN embargo—and all this even before any rubber has actually been shipped. This attitude is accentuated by fact that same rubber can be shipped to Soviet Union and Soviet satellites and even to Red China itself via Soviet and satellite ports. The Indonesians are also well aware (as stated in Deptel 39) of current moves towards relaxation COCOM controls. Up to now (and I labor the point that so far we have no specific evidence that a final decision has been made in this matter) the Indonesians have loyally supported UN embargo. Apparently they think they are now reaching the end of their rope: domestic considerations; the example of Ceylon; cessation of actual hostilities in Korea; a confused idea of what an “independent policy” calls for; and perhaps the desire to throw an anchor to windward in view of Communist successes in Indochina; perhaps even the feeling that US differences with its British and French allies weaken the US position—all these factors must, I think, be influencing the thinking of Indonesian Government leaders and even opposition leaders.

Assuming it is in the over-all interest of the US to try to adopt such course of action as will obviate the necessity for termination of aid, Embassy and USOM recommend for consideration the following:

We believe that rather than let the situation continue to drift until some climax is reached disadvantageous to both Indonesia and ourselves, we should take the initiative in seeking to establish a climate conducive to a realistic study of what is after all a mutual problem. Rightly or wrongly Indonesians share with many other Asians a belief that the US does not take into account their problems and their point of view in the same way that they think we do with our European friends. If we can discuss this rubber problem with them frankly and confidentially we will at least have done what we could to impress upon them that we do wish to try to understand their viewpoint and that given time and opportunity and their confidence we will do our best to arrive at a solution not unfavorable to their interests.

In other words our proposal is to discuss the entire matter with the Prime Minister in a cooperative, helpful manner but one designed to bring about solution of the matter in accordance with our views; that is if possible to induce the Indonesian Government to stop the shipment. It should be remembered Indonesian Government has not yet admitted ship’s destination is Red China; that Prime Minister is “looking into matter”; and he has easy out if he wishes by diverting shipment to Polish port.

Jones and I are seeing Prime Minister 9 o’clock Monday morning³ and we would like direct our discussion in the foregoing conciliatory vein unless events have overtaken us. So as not to commit the Department or FOA I would prefer to develop the discussion “personally and on my own initiative”.

I think that time is of the essence if we are not to lose the possibility of an initiative made in face of the rising tide of adverse press treatment.

If I do not receive word from Department to the contrary I will proceed along foregoing lines.

Cumming

1. Document 276.
2. Document 277 and supra.
3. July 19.