Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2

493.56D9/7–354: Telegram

No. 275
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Indonesia

secret
priority

Washington, July 3, 1954—12:14 p.m.

16. Pursuant Deptel 13¹ Baldwin² called in Mukarto 9 a.m. Saturday³ and made statement including numbered points reftel. In addition mentioned problem serious adverse publicity detrimental United States-Indonesian relations if UN embargo broken. Major stress placed on fact would be first violation UN embargo and would seriously undermine principle collective action and prestige UN.

On personal basis Baldwin contrasted smallness Chinese Communist market with that of United States. Baldwin also stressed belief we would be less than friendly if we failed inform Indonesian Government fact we are bound by our legislation if UN embargo knowingly violated and would additionally be under strong domestic pressures.

Mukarto denied knowledge Pulaski shipment but said if true Indonesian Government decision would have been result serious consideration and “based on national interest”. He emphasized deteriorating economic situation and enormous pressures on Government seek additional outlets Indonesian rubber. He declared despite recent three cent rise price rubber, terms of trade still seriously adverse Indonesia compared prewar.

Declaring he personally adhered to policy he had pursued as Foreign Minister in opposing such shipments, Mukarto said he would cable his Government immediately. He felt however best way accommodating internal pressures would be to permit small number small shipments permitting Indonesian people become convinced smallness Communist Chinese market and inadequate returns. Mukarto stated he understood United States policy designed prevent large-scale shipments.

Baldwin replied difficulty closing door to trade once opened and that what involved would be principle violation UN embargo, adding that United States Government would be bound by its legislation in such event.

Mukarto said he hoped United States would not take strong measures against Indonesia, pleading newness independence and fact people had to be educated slowly and carefully for democracy. He declared firmly any measures or statements which could be interpreted by either Indonesian Government or public as “interference in Indonesian affairs” would have completely perverse effect. He advised careful “psychological approach” which would stress a) UN angle b) United States difficulties and desire continue help and maintain cordial relations c) United States appreciation Indonesian situation. He recommended American Ambassador make such approach not only Prime Minister but President and Vice President who greatly influence Government decisions.

In addition seeing Prime Minister, unless you perceive objection, you should discuss matter with President and Vice President.⁴

Dulles

1. Supra.
2. Charles F. Baldwin, Economic Coordinator for the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs.
3. July 3.

4. Ambassador Cumming replied on July 7:

   “Final paragraph Department 16. I feel it inadvisable for present to take matter up with Sukarno. However, I have undertaken through secure channels to get full story to Hatta who is now in Sumatra.” (Telegram 42; 493.56D9/7–754)