Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2

656D.00/6–1554: Telegram

No. 273
The Ambassador in Indonesia (Cumming) to the Department of State

secret

Djakarta, June 15, 1954—5 p.m.

1496. Limit distribution. At meeting with President Sukarno this morning I presented him with set of Lincoln’s works and a film of President Eisenhower’s TV speech of April 5,¹ both provided by USIA. President was greatly pleased.

Remainder of conversation, which lasted over forty-five minutes, revolved around Irian. Irian was the warp and other topics as they arose the woof of the pattern of impressions which Sukarno almost too obviously wished to leave in my mind.

After exchange of amenities, during which President said he was glad to have a private conversation with me and hoped that I would permit him to be as frank as he wished me to be, he asked me for my views on “the politics of the day” and added “by politics I mean your views on Irian”. I said that I had heard the Indo position expressed by a number of people but would appreciate hearing first hand from him his own views. He very briefly summarized his well known statements of the past laying special emphasis on the failure of the Dutch in the past even to discuss the problem. He spoke very quietly and without histrionics, and the whole conversation continued in that tone. I elaborated on the points I made to Sunario as reported my telegram 1153,² emphasizing the potential greatness of Indos future; the part he could play in making Indo influence a force for good and for stability in Southeast Asia and in Asia as a whole; and our hope that even though our two countries might not see eye to eye on every issue we might develop a close and lasting relationship. I stressed our historic aversion to colonialism in all its forms and the steps we had taken in recent years to give expression to our attitude, such as Philippine independence and more especially the untiring efforts of Secretary Dulles to bring about real independence for the Associated States in Indochina. I called attention, on the other hand, to our world-wide interests and commitments such as ANZUS and NATO, the latter including our wartime and present day ally, The Netherlands. I suggested to him my personal view that colonialism except as practiced by Soviet Union would inevitably wither away but that such momentous changes in the historic pattern of world relationships developed over the past two or three centuries could not take place overnight. I concluded by asking him to appreciate the reason for our neutrality in Irian matter, caught as we might otherwise be in a dispute between our good friend Indonesia on the one hand and our close ally The Netherlands on the other.

Sukarno listened very intently and remarked that I had made a very appealing exposition of US views which he could understand but could not agree with. He said he thought we were making a great mistake in linking our European interests with our Asian interests; that “his people”, who were inexperienced in world affairs, could only see that the US would not support their desire to “reincorporate Irian in the Indo State” and that this was equivalent to support of the Dutch position; that on the other hand they heard constantly repeated Soviet and Communist Chinese support of Indo claims and this tended, despite our record as anti-colonialist, to make Indo people feel that the important aspect of American policy was not so much anti-communism as anti-Asian (sic).

I replied that I did not think our position on Irian involved the linking of European and Asian considerations but rather the difficult and trying task of reconciling sometimes divergent interests and obligations in widely separated parts of the world. I used the well worn figure of the ripples caused by a stone thrown into a pond.

I said that as an American I felt confident that despite mistakes we had made from time to time, in the long run the peoples of Asia would come to understand our real sympathy with their true aims and aspirations and appreciate the many things we had done to help them attain and protect their independence. To this Sukarno replied that we should not forget that the peoples of Asia were rapidly developing their own points of view and that if we delayed too long settling such problems as Irian along the lines of Asian wishes we might find that Soviet propaganda had penetrated and won over the hearts of Asian people. (At this first interview with Sukarno I did not think any useful purpose would be served by questioning too openly his identification of the desires of the Indo people—which really means Sukarno’s personal aims—with the aspirations of the Asian people who in my opinion know little and care less about the future of Irian.)

Sukarno said he did not understand why we did not intervene in Irian question when we had already intervened in Korea and in Indochina. I tried to make clear to him the difference between our participation in Korea as a member of UN, our “intervention” in Indochina and the Irian dispute. This gave me an opportunity to open up points suggested in Department telegram 1078.³ He made no comment except to say, in reply to my direct question, that while he and perhaps most Indo leaders realized the threat that a Communist control of Indochina would pose to Indo, the people of Indo saw only that we would not support them in their Irian ambitions. I said that I did not wish to take issue with him and would not ask him to comment on what I was about to say but that I could not feel in my heart that if he as the great leader of the Indo people really felt that a Communist Indochina was a threat to Indo he would fail to make that clear to his people at proper time.

The meeting broke up in a very friendly spirit and the President said he would be glad to talk with me again at any time. He was good enough to say that he appreciated my frankness and friendly manner. When I left the room I found Abu Hanifah, Adviser General of Foreign Office in charge American affairs, waiting to see President.

The meeting was not very productive. It confirmed more by inference than direction some of the observations reported my telegram 1467.⁴ It seems to me only natural that given Sukarno’s absorption with Irian he should concentrate on that subject at our first meeting. Despite fact that subject will arise again, I believe that after a suitable interval I should take advantage of his suggestion and have another talk with him which might elicit his views on the broader Asian picture.

Cumming

1. Radio and television address to the American people on the State of the Nation; text in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954, p. 372.
2. See footnote 4, Document 270.
3. Dated June 12; it suggested that in discussing Indochina with President Sukarno, Ambassador Cumming emphasize U.S. concern for the complete independence of the Associated States, the imminence of the Communist threat to Indochina and all of Southeast Asia including Indonesia, and the need to establish a regional organization to protect the newly independent states against that threat. (751G.00/6–1254)
4. Dated June 11, not printed.