756D.00/4–1454
No. 267
The Ambassador in Indonesia (Cumming) to the Department of State
No. 645
Ref:
- Hague despatch 819 of March 5, 1954 and Deptel to Djakarta 767, rptd Hague 10661
Subject:
- Situation in Indonesia
The Department’s referenced telegram requests the Embassy’s comment on the estimate made by Foreign Minister Luns to Ambassador Matthews on the situation in Indonesia. Minister Luns expressed grave concern over the general deterioration which he felt was taking place in Indonesia.…
[Page 420]There has unquestionably been a progressive deterioration of the Indonesian political and economic situation during the past 18 months and it is not impossible that this deterioration may continue uninterrupted during the months to come.…
There can be no questioning of Minister Luns’ basic contention that the last two years have seen a progressive deterioration in the economic and political situation in Indonesia. Certain aspects of this disintegration, however, could not be considered as entirely unexpected. With the waning in force of the central unifying centripetal element in Indonesian political life, the common struggle for independence, it would seem logical to anticipate in a country such as Indonesia, with great land and sea distances, poor communications, with a politically immature population of widely different ethnic and cultural backgrounds, that domestic political fragmentation and struggle for power, together with a general development and strengthening of the centrifugal forces inherent in the social and political structure of the Indonesia nation, would take place. Whatever the validity of this thesis, it is true that in the past two years Indonesia’s basic economic, demographic, and political problems have been augmented by a growth in provincial dissatisfaction with the central government, by a deteriorating internal security situation, by increasingly bitter inter-party political conflict, and by a resurgence and return to a position of influence of the Indonesian Communist Party. Even this incomplete enumeration of certain current and obvious evidences of disintegration and deterioration provide, apparently, more than adequate grounds for a pessimistic estimate of Indonesia’s immediate future.
There are, however, certain basic aspects of the Indonesian situation which tend to relieve an otherwise almost uniformly gloomy picture and perhaps even provide grounds for some reserved optimism.
The very conditions which have impeded the development of an integrated, unified state from a nation extending over hundreds of miles of islands and seas—poor communications, divergent cultural ethnic groups—have also tended to soften and delay the impact in one section of Indonesia, of disturbances and disruptions in other sections of the country. This looseness of its political and economic organization has given Indonesia a flexibility and resilience to shocks which would completely disrupt a tightly knit, integrated, geographically unitary state. In a sense, therefore, almost all developments in Indonesia are “local” developments.
The fact that the vast majority of Indonesian people are engaged in subsistence agriculture has also contributed to the above mentioned basic flexibility, resilience and stability of the Indonesian [Page 421] social and economic structure. (In gang-ravaged West Java, rice production in 1953 was greater than in 1952.)
The disillusionment, cynicism, and bitter conflicts characteristic of the political atmosphere in Djakarta are much less evident outside the capital city.
Although imperfectly understood, there is among the small educated group ruling Indonesia today a deep respect and emotional attachment to Western concepts of democratic liberalism. This Dutch cultural heritage is reflected in Indonesian political life, among other ways, by a general acceptance of parliamentary procedures as the proper system of government for Indonesia, by a belief that a free exchange of ideas is necessary for a healthy democracy, and by an almost overly tolerant attitude towards divergent political ideologies. An immature, ill-informed, fractious, but independent press, conscious of its role in a democratic society, exists. With the exception of the Indonesian Communist Party and the outlawed DI, no Indonesian political party could be justly accused of aspiring to dictatorial powers.
The person of Sukarno, and the office of the presidency, provide a significant element of continuity and stability, and constitute a unifying force of considerable importance. Sukarno shares with other Indonesian non-Communist leaders the above mentioned respect for democratic institutions and practices, and he has lent both by his actions and words the weight of his considerable influence to their support. It is impossible to predict how Sukarno will use his power in the future, but at present he appears to be sincerely and self-consciously dedicated to the task of guiding the development of “his” nation along democratic and constitutional paths—as he understands these concepts.
Although the Indonesian Communist Party is in a stronger position today than at any time since immediately prior to the Madiun uprising, it is not at present in a position to make a successful bid for power. Many of Indonesia’s present leaders continue to show a disquieting tolerance of Communist organizational activity, a naive confidence that the PKI can be used with impunity to further their own political ends, and a stubborn reluctance to abandon the idea that Communism is somehow “liberal” and “progressive”. Nevertheless, with the PKI resurgence have come encouraging signs that the lesson of Madiun may not have been forgotten and that even those presently cooperating with the PKI may be beginning to doubt the Communist’s claims that they are a nationalist political party free of Moscow or Peking control.
Indonesia has no common boundary with a country under Communist control.
[Page 422]The Indonesian national police constitutes a well-organized, generally well-led, and non-political law enforcement body which has demonstrated by its actions the realistic and pragmatic attitude that the Communists represent a threat to law and order. The Indonesian Army, while split by internal difference, and subject to constant political pressures, has remained successfully, essentially non-political, and its top leadership, with few exceptions, has shown itself loyal to the concept of the Army as the servant and defender of the state.
In listing some of the elements in the current Indonesian situation which are considered to exercise a stabilizing influence or to ameliorate disruptive influences it is not the Embassy’s intention to minimize the seriousness of the Indonesian situation as it exists today. A Communist victory in Indochina and an expansion of Communist control into the Malayan Peninsula; a successful Communist infiltration of the Army and the police or the development of a para military force under Communist control; the emergence into open violence, clearly under the surface, of present day Indonesian political antagonisms; the death of Sukarno; could produce, singly or in combination, a rapid and extremely grave deterioration in the local situation. It is felt, however, that the situation as it exists today does not justify an estimate as pessimistic as that expressed by Minister Luns, and that certain basic stabilizing forces may be strong enough to maintain a viable Indonesian Government for some time to come.
Department please pass copies to London, Paris, The Hague, Moscow, New Delhi, Tokyo, Manila, Bangkok, Rangoon, Singapore, Taipei.2