Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2

756D.00/2–1053: Telegram

No. 244
The Ambassador in Indonesia (Cochran)¹ to the Department of State

secret

Djakarta, February 10, 1953—11 a.m.

1493. It is realized that over-all US foreign policy must be evolved through consideration of factors more important than US relationship with Indonesia. However, since Indonesia is new state of almost 80,000,000 people, with great natural and potential wealth, with location of some strategic importance and with declared intention not to take sides in present international struggle, there is merit in endeavoring set out general lines for US policy during coming year. In Embtel 1478² I gave review our efforts aid Indonesia with public funds. Embtel 1480³ provided my general views of Indonesian situation as of early 1953.

What Indonesia will do or what will happen to Indonesia this year cannot be forecast with any degree of sureness, since (1) internal developments may upset charted course or (2) external affairs, specifically growing conflict between Democratic and Commie ideologies and forces, conceivably may sweep this defenseless country off its base of independence and Democracy. These are suggestions which it may prove feasible and desirable to follow in our determination to help this young country succeed as sovereign state and in our desire to achieve maximum benefit from our relationship with this country:

I. General.

To practice understanding patience and to exercise unswerving firmness are both essential if we are either to be helpful to Indo on its uphill road or are to command respect due us as greatest world power. We cannot rush Indo openly into our camp and we should be mindful not only of beneficial results but also disadvantages obligations that might follow such achievement.

II. Political.

It is recommended that:

a. Remain in our relations with Indo friendly but not solicitous, interested but not eager. We should maintain in Djakarta consolidated and loyal single US Govt unit which will merit and receive Washington’s support for its varied operations.

b. Appreciate Indo interest in international affairs and UN, while reminding them that their greatest contribution at this stage of their development would be to solidify their own state along lines that will ensure its Democratic character and its capability of taking an honorable and influential, although necessarily secondary, position in brotherhood of nations. We should not hesitate where appropriate, to remind Indos frankly they have obligations well as privileges from UN membership. We should also use stronger hand with successor to Palar at UN than has been possible with Palar himself, in view of his early association with UN and US efforts in behalf of Indo sovereignty.

c. Keep close personal contact with both Pres. Sukarno and Vice Pres. Hatta, realizing that Indonesia needs them both, that neither is self-sufficient but they compliment each other in spite of long standing differences in character, ideas and tactics, and that maintenance Indo democracy depends primarily upon these two men. Events described Embtel 1480 emphasize importance Sukarno to nation at this time.⁴

d. Should keep in mind advantages that might accrue to us through Sukarno making his long desired visit US if it is seen he is sufficiently surmounting difficulties at home and sure enough of his own position to permit him follow line of policy and public expression that would have support Indo and still be acceptable US.

e. Be mindful that Sukarno considers our support for question of West Irian greatest possible contribution we can make to help him consolidate his country and keep it non-communist. On Irian question we should maintain position that Indonesia and Netherlands should work out by direct amicable negotiation question of sovereignty over area, while resisting pressure from Australia.

f. Not take any position in drawing Indo into Pacific or other defensive pacts but realize that at some time it might be possible to work out compromise on Irian acceptable to Indos in general framework arrangements with Netherlands, Australia, and Eastern neighbors. We should refrain cautiously from any premature move or hint in this direction as conditions are not propitious now and prospects could be ruined by tipping our hands.

g. Continue with USIS program, perhaps slightly smaller and more subdued, with emphasis on cultural program rather than blatant propaganda output. Specific suggestions along this line to follow by despatch.

III. Economic.

It is recommended that we follow lines laid down in Embtel 1478 and preceding related messages in providing Indo program of economic and technical assistance in FY 53 and 54 intended primarily to increase food production and afford expert engineering advice and services. Unless Indo shows greater receptivity to and appreciation of this aid, unmistakably of character most needed and most free from suspicion of political strings or influence than have greeted our efforts and offers to date, no further grant assistance with US public funds should be extended. New credits from US public funds should be limited to those which Exim Bank might see fit provide for specific projects. Such projects should be restricted to those J.G. White Engineers find economically feasible and warranted and which would be carried out by US engineering firms under contract approved by Exim Bank.

Indos should be constantly reminded future development their natural resources depends primarily on attracting foreign private capital. They should be provided with documentation and advice on how to treat foreign capital. US private capital already invested in Indo should be given staunch support and Indos given to understand that US Govt demands that its citizens and their capital be properly respected and treated.

All United States official aid to Indonesia should be promptly stopped in event Indonesia contravenes United Nations embargoes or Battle Act, and such aid should be similarly stopped if Indonesia fails to give within 1953 treatment to United States private capital already invested here which would warrant continuation of such investment.

Bilateral treaty of friendship and trade should be negotiated with Indonesia soon as possible, and urgently if denunciation of Round Table Agreements appeared imminent.

We should bear in mind that Indonesians while facing year of financial embarrassment are not confronted with starvation or near starvation and are not likely to be. Their domestic economy will maintain itself at steady subsistence level. We should not approach Indonesian problem with view that aid rendered along economic lines is likely to be reflected in more favorable political outlook.

IV. Military.

It is recommended that:

(a) Indonesia not be looked upon as military ally of potential worth in foreseeable future;

(b) Until present situation within armed forces of Indonesia is more satisfactory, no United States arms be provided such forces even on reimbursable basis;

(c) Equipment for mobile brigade of civil police be provided on reimbursable basis only if request therefore endorsed by President Sukarno (and Vice President Hatta in accord there with following confidential approach to him by Embassy);

(d) United States not offer or be induced to send military mission to replace Netherlands military mission Indonesia in present circumstances and atmosphere;

(e) Consideration be given to identifying those parts of Indonesia which would be militarily most helpful in event third war, perhaps tin islands and Sumatran oil field and refineries;

(f) Service attaches be limited in number but selected for outstanding ability in intelligence work;

(g) Visits to Indonesia by United States service planes and naval vessels be avoided until atmosphere improves or genuine necessity arises.

V. Conclusion.

Indonesians are likely to remain sensitive and suspicious over course coming year. They will not make decision to join publicly with United States and Western Allies against communism. We are more likely to bring them voluntarily into this position if we move cautiously and underplay rather than overplay our hand. They may awake to menace of communism if infiltration in Nationalist Party continues and if Communists move too quickly, as they have on occasion in the past. Whether their realization of menace comes as result internal developments, external moves, or simply more realistic Indonesian thinking, we are more likely to be able to capitalize on it if we have been circumspect in past and not made overt moves aimed at pushing Indonesians one direction or the other. Our actions during this period should be aimed at convincing Indonesians they are not vital to United States interests and that it is up to them to show us what they want and what they deserve.

Cochran

1. Cochran resigned his position as Ambassador to Indonesia and left the post on Feb. 27.
2. In telegram 1478, Feb. 9, Cochran recommended fiscal year programs of $3 or $4 million to operate solely on the technical level and cautioned against lavish or careless grants of U.S. aid. (856D.00TA/2–953)

3. The summary section of telegram 1480, Feb. 9, reads:

   “1953 promises be painful year of forced economies, political party maneuvering, strife—either hidden or open—within armed services, procrastination by weak government on major issues, continuing violent disorders, and efforts of Sukarno as dominating force. Economic-financial situation should be bearable and offer in itself no ground for Communist growth, democracy should survive, and real accomplishments in upbuilding of Indonesian state since 1949 should be more evident once this trying year is over.” (756D.00/2–953)

4. In the telegram, Cochran complimented Sukarno on his handling of the Oct. 17 affair, stating that the President had perhaps prevented a bloody civil war and dictatorship at the time. The message went on to say that Sukarno was having little success in consolidating the country.