Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2

756D.00/10–952: Telegram

No. 224
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Indonesia

secret

Washington, October 9, 1952—6:07 p.m.

536. For: Amb Cochran.

1. Dept welcomes report urtel 660 on Cabinet crisis and concurs your opinion Indo refusal accept innocuous US draft is indicative caution prevailing in Govt circles during this crisis.¹ Dept aware need for US handle aid agreements problem with care to avoid creating any basis for accusation of having contributed to Cabinet collapse if this occurs. Dept therefore wishes in accordance third suggestion last para urtel 644² discontinue further talks re aid agreements until situation more propitious.

2. On other hand US Govt, of course, does not wish suspend talks formally in such manner as to convey to Indos that US refuses further discussion. If Indo Govt takes initiative in raising any questions with regard to proposed new aid agreements, pls reply that US Govt is studying this question and that you will be pleased to transmit whatever communication is desired.

3. In meantime Dept reviewing recommendations urtel 662³ in conjunction urtel 644. In specific response recommendation No. 1 urtel 662, US laws do not permit US Govt waive substance legal provisions set forth in draft Note, but on other hand are not rigid as to acceptable form in which substance may be given. Question under active study.

Pending Dept reply avoid any action which might create impression US Govt has solidified its position on this matter.

Acheson

1. On Oct. 9, Ambassador Cochran reported on a conversation held with Vice President Hatta the previous day mainly concerning the Cabinet crisis:

   “I gave Hatta account of recent developments in TCA negotiations of which he was entirely unaware. I told him I did not see how my government could eliminate two remaining technical provisions to which Wilopo took exception. I told him I hesitated to undertake personally or to recommend that my government try to influence Mukarto or Wilopo toward course of action that might conceivably contribute to downfall of Cabinet or otherwise seriously embarrass them in this crisis. I wondered if our best service to Indo might be to suspend aid program because of Indo inability accept it on required terms without causing disproportionate domestic difficulties. Hatta promptly said it should be suspended. We cannot of course quote Vice President on this but I assured Department I objectively asked same question through three different approaches and got identical answers.” (Telegram 660; 756D.00/10–952)

2. Document 222.
3. Supra.