Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2

856D.00 TA/9–352: Telegram

No. 214
The Ambassador in Indonesia (Cochran) to the Department of State

secret
priority

Djakarta, September 3, 1952—11 a.m.

435. For Allison from Ambassador. Ref your 319¹ requesting my frank comments on tactics to be followed in Indo aid negotiations.

Embtel 429² reported latest developments in negotiations so far as I am aware. To account of my meeting with Mukarto I added recommendations which I felt if followed would protect Department from any possible charge of neglect in seeking proper legal basis for its granting of aid to Indo and in requiring assurances prescribed therefor by Cong.

In view of limited directive I had (Deptel 325)³ for discussing aid question with Mukarto and fact he had months ago transferred negotiations thereon to Ambassador Ali and Department, I did not feel free to question instructions which he said he had sent Ali or to endeavor ascertain his reaction to any reservations that my govt might see fit to raise, along line of my specific suggestions or otherwise. Mukarto’s attitude was certainly one of confidence that Dept would be glad to meet his terms. From Deptels 152 and 153⁴ it might be understood that Dept would welcome this among drawn out difficulty being closed by an arrangement such as you and Ali discussed. I am sorry that we have not had opportunity to sit down together to talk over whole case and decide maximum we could feasibly exact from Indos. I have felt it my duty to strive for full compliance with contractual and congressional requirements.

In Embtel 371 of Aug 21⁵ I had recommended termination of Hatta agreement. In effort meet opinion set forth in second para your 319 I advanced idea of having Indos amend and then ratify Hatta agreement, rather than insist on new agreement based on latest legislation. I cannot tell how Indos would react to either suggestion until they may be faced with the choice. But I strongly feel that we are leaving ourselves open to trouble if we give any future military aid, either grant or reimbursable, in absence of any Indo ratified agreement that can be and is made public in both countries. We face dangers in either permitting Hatta agreement, within enforceable secret clauses, to serve as base for aid operations beyond constabularly arrangement now being completed, or in having this brought into open for amendment and ratification.

Indos apparently willing finally to submit ECA agreement for ratification if they get what they consider acceptable arrangement on assurances. However, time when we could accept Indo oral undertakings or promises of future action is past. I have repeatedly urged that we assist Indos reach clear cut decisions by obliging them either comply with normal contractual and congressional requirements or have aid terminated.

For US now to accept Mukarto’s conditions for Indos accepting our aid may grant short term advantage to Wilopo govt. Whether long term interests of Indo and US relations therewith will best be served by Indo giving up benefits of 511a and appearing before world as irresponsible on contracts is surely open to question. The new arrangement might be an unfortunate precedent for both countries.

Wibisono, Sukiman, Subardjo and Djuanda are among moderate leaders who have recently come out in open favoring orientation toward West and particularly US. Wilopo and Mukarto have also deprecated possibility of obtaining aid from Commies and favored accepting aid from those who can give it. It remains to be seen how sincere Wilopo govt will be in following up more reasonable attitude toward US. Admitted disillusionment over possible benefits from dealings with Commies, plus concern over internal security, unbalanced budget and deteriorating balance of payments should increasingly cause Indos realize genuine interest lies in close and amicable relations with US. They will of necessity approach us for many favors in foreseeable future.

It seems to me that this is not time to be weak and indulgent and incur further disrespect on part of Indo, but to be firm and demand that full respect of which US as great power most friendly to Indo is entitled. I am most appreciative of support you and Andrews are giving me in trying get TCA functioning effectively, and I assure you of my desire to reciprocate as helpfully as possible. I know that you must be as sick and tired as I am of having this unsolved aid affair continue to plague us. Cognizant of many other burdens which you are carrying, I should like to see you freed of this soonest possible. But if you are forced into sitting this out until Indos come to our proper terms, I am prepared to give you all possible support.⁶

Cochran

1. Document 212.
2. Supra.
3. Dated Aug. 29, not printed. (856D.00 TA/8–2952)
4. Documents 210 and 211.
5. Not printed.

6. Allison sent the following interim reply to Ambassador Cochran on Sept. 3:

   “Greatly appreciate ur 435. Considerations contained therein and recommendations in ur 429 receiving urgent and thorough study here. You will be informed soon as possible of results.” (Telegram 335; 856D.00 TA/9–352)