Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2

756D.21/6–1652: Telegram

No. 204
The Ambassador in Indonesia (Cochran) to the Department of State

secret
priority

Djakarta, June 16, 1952—5 p.m.

1809. In response request from FonOff explained informally to SYG Darmasetiawan June 12 gen idea trans MSA to TCA (Embtel 1792).¹ Cabinet mtg planned for deciding reply to be given 19th by govt to Parl postponed from 13th to 17th because illness FonMin Mukarto and lack progress preparing for statement. Anticipate govt will not take sufficiently clear-cut position on MSA assurance or change to TCA in its statement to make this basic issue in vote confidence and that any expansion over previous statements will only increase confusion. Govt may not even ask vote of confidence but simply “permission for govt to carry on”.

After witnessing three successive Indo Govt’s failures submit ECA agreement for ratification and two flounder over question TCA [MSA?] assurances, I am convinced that no real decision will be taken and that only delay, confusion, misunderstanding, and recrimination will result unless US seizes initiative and shows way out of impasse—witness record of past five months. I realize attempt US force issue may result in unfavorable Indo decision but feel even unfavorable decision has real advantage over continued confusion.

I believe prelim decision necessary on part of US re minimum objectives Amer aid programs for Indo. If minimum objective is merely to keep the program going in hope it eventually generates its own support, then US shld make no move risking unfavorable Indo decision but rather encourage avoidance real issues. I realize that from point view of world-wide MSP objectives, there may be justification for merely avoiding termination Indo program and am ready fol instrs to that effect. But I believe continuation program that basis undermines rather than strengthens Amer objectives and prestige within Indo and I recommend strongly against it. If minimum program objectives are, as I believe, to contribute to internal strength of friendly nation and to enhance possibility Indo-Amer friendly coop, then I recommend fol positive procedure. Promptly after US Pres signs pertinent US legis and Indo Govt receives vote confidence or equivalent, Emb shld present to FonOff very carefully worded note including the following:

1. Notification to Indo Govt of change effective July 1 from MSA to TCA in US aid for Indo. Emb assumes from Depcirctel 1032 that Dept is already preparing such statement and awaits receipt.²

2. Review of historic development US aid program to Indo to show stages thru which program has passed, amt and type of aid already given, several agreements already entered into, and natural evolution from ECA to MSA to TCA.

3. Explanation that change from MSA to TCA is mandatory under US legis, that TCA is integral part of MSP program, shares its philosophy and objectives, involves assurances under terms of MSA Act of 1951, and implies voluntary request and support on part of participating nations.

3. [sic] Explanation to Indo Govt that in view of uncertainty as regards Indo attitude, as reflected by informal Indo advances made in Wash, US Govt feels it shld not risk embarrassment either to itself or to Indo by activating TCA program for Indo before it is officially informed by Indo Govt whether there now exists or can be created in Indo the legal and psychological basis for a worthwhile program. Specifically US Govt suggests that prior to any new TCA program undertakings, it is necessary for Indo Govt either (a) clearly to confirm past agreements (ECA basic agreement of 1950, MSA assurances of 1952) concerning validity of both of which from Indo point of view serious question has been raised, or (b) formally to undertake negot of new agreement under MSA Act of 1951 and to give such mutually satis new agreement as may be reached, accepted legal status in Indo by Parl ratification or whatever other process is judged adequate.

4. Renewed expression of Amer willingness to engage in coop program of econ and technical assistance for Indo provided that Indos themselves demonstrate that they actively approve and support program. Reiteration that from Amer side there are certain limitations already placed upon program by Cong legis, that from Indo side, certain conditions use logically to be expected, and that mutually agreed upon terms of coop must conform not merely to one or the other but to both Amer and Indo tin policy positions.

5. Notification to Indo Govt that this note will be published by US on June 30 together with any reply that may be received by that date; that note itself will be published on that date if no reply yet received; and that Indo Govt is free at any time to publish note and, of course, its own reply.

I cannot predict that Indo Govt will give clearly favorable, clearly unfavorable, or indeed any reply at all to such. But I feel that by thus getting the Amer position on the record in a manner that will lead to widespread local publicity, we stand our best chance of having the inevitable continuation of local debate directed toward relevant rather than irrelevant and deliberately distractionary [distracting?] issues. And I believe that by clearly making the TCA program contingent upon some clarification of Indo stand and some indication of Indo support, we gain a chance of achieving a meaningful and popular program. At worst, I believe that this formula gives face-saving escape for both Indo and US—in other words, the natural death of the program for lack of Indo effort at revival. Indos prefer in this order: No decision, decision thrust upon them, decision implicit in not deciding. This formula provides for either of last two, and local pressures resulting from publication of note may weigh in favor of taking the decision suggested to them.

I request Dept comment and decision. Wld draft note in such manner let it be understood US position necessitated legal requirements and am endeavoring avoid impression undue pressure or impatience. Will appreciate Dept’s draft or suggestion. I make this recommendation because I feel it is absolutely imperative we get this business on legal and moral basis before proceeding with new aid program under State Dept responsibility, and that Indo Govt indicate it actually wants such aid.

Cochran

1. Not printed. Following enactment of the Mutual Security Act of 1952, approved by President Truman on June 20, 1952 (66 Stat. 141), MSA was required to discontinue its economic aid programs as of June 30 in countries such as Indonesia where there were no longer any military aid programs. Responsibility for the economic assistance programs was to be transferred in such countries to the TCA. See also telegram 1354, infra.
2. Telegram 1032 is not printed. The text of a statement on the transfer from MSA to TCA, dated July 3, is printed in Department of State Bulletin, July 14, 1952, p. 61.