756D.5 MSP/4–952: Telegram

No. 198
The Ambassador in Indonesia (Cochran) to the Department of State


1491. Eyes only Lacy. Just received memo dated March 241 of conversation between Galbraith and Maramis indicating Amb Ali resented being by-passed on MSA negotiations. Press reports indicate Ali has great confidence in Mukarto and that latter reserves position with respect MSA until arrival Indo and opportunity consult with Cabinet colleagues.

Presume Ali entirely cognizant position I have taken and wholehearted support of Dept behind me. Believe this excellent opportunity therefore for Ali to exercise helpful influence on young PNI [Page 281] colleague now to become FonMin. Hope they will both see fit assist in convincing Indo Govt essentiality respecting undertaking honorably entered into by responsible Indo FonMin through my Emb.

Local press which opposed 511 (a) assurances under MSA already reviving issue and suggesting new cabinet negotiate diplomatically for “amendment” which would really mean substitution 511 (b). Argument is that Wilopo Govt of course recognizes binding character assurances given but should endeavor work out acceptable “amendment” prior reconvening Parliament in order avoid acrimonious debate and possible injury to overall Indo-Amer relations.

This is line of approach we have expected. I will not bore you with repeating all my arguments. I simply submit that in coming campaign towards achieving order Indo military and police authorities will need security aid. In such emergency as we can easily envisage if Commie forces in Asia move southward, Indo would certainly need security aid. There is absolutely no ground to justify econ aid alone or any factors whatever which would honestly warrant our permitting Indos switch from 511 (a) to (b).

For almost four years I have taken responsibility of vouching for good intentions and sympathetic attitude moderate Indo leaders. I have obtained important financial and other aid for them on what amounted to my personal guarantee. I have “covered” their secret missions to US for security training and police equipment. I have assisted in obtaining priorities for exports to Indo of type accorded our allies in arms.

For their part, Indos have failed to make any move toward ratifying bilateral ECA agreement negotiated Oct 1950. They threw out Sukiman govt because it gave those assurances required by US legislation to permit Indo receive type assistance it actually needs. They took this action in spite our having made every modification or permitted every interpretation requested by Indo Govt. They are now threatening do business with Commies if we do not meet their trade demands as well as terms on which they willing accept our taxpayers money.

Believe our attitude henceforth must be absolutely firm. Indos must be brought to understand that it now devolves upon them to show their good intentions toward us. Through their acts they must convince us we have been justified in adopting generous policy we have consistently followed in past and that this course shld be pursued in future. Most immed and convincing gesture which can be made this juncture is to adhere without further ado to MSA agreement as negotiated.

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