756D.00/2–2252: Telegram
No. 193
The Ambassador in Indonesia (Cochran) to the Department of State
niact
1250. Ousting of Subardjo and threat to life of entire Cabinet over MSA issue illustrates beyond question US can not and must not force it on any reluctant Indo Govt (Embtel 1249).1
During recent crisis criticism of US reached all-time high with every US move subject hostile suspicion and with all Indo factions professing to accept as first premise view that in relations with Indo US entertains only highly selfish aim of forcing Indo through econ pressure to become its satellite. Vilification US in local press widespread. Neither any important leader any polit faction nor Pres or Vice Pres has publicly given US benefit of any doubt or made any public mention of possibility that US may act from other than selfish motives. Our efforts in support new republic over recent years at least temporarily overlooked in intense wave nationalism and isolationism.
We believe we must now seek impress on Indos fact US does not wish to buy their independence from them; does not want to estab econ hegemony over them; and will not sell its prestige and honor for temporary advantage this or other area. Indos must also be made to understand that US does not rely on their material or moral support, which wld be most welcome and valued if given through Indo’s own free choice but will not be bought at cost of US dignity and decency in international relations. Indos must also be impressed with fact that US which has long been champion of free and independent nations everywhere can and does act out of other [Page 273] than selfish motives and does not appreciate being undefended target one-sided carping criticism and incessant sniping.
Suggest in future dealings with Indos we adopt friendly but firm attitude making perfectly clear we are not in mood for endless generous concessions to them in econ, polit, or mil fields. We will pay them fair price for their exports to US (which is country with which they can most advantageously trade) and we will expect fair price which Indos can well afford to pay for whatever they may wish to secure from us. We believe policy interests US best served by impressing Indos that we are not engaged in world-wide give away program, but on contrary, we are endeavoring first and most urgently to help those countries which are allied with us against mutually recognized common danger and, secondly to aid those under-developed countries which, because of unfavorable balance of payments, can not pay for needed capital equipment or tech assistance. Since Indo falls into neither category and is not willing assume responsibilities which by act of Congress we are required to place upon it in order to receive only type MSA aid which Indo really needs, we believe our purpose wld best be served by recognizing Indo sensitivities, respecting their views of “independence” and withdrawing econ assistance, which has made us target of unfavorable publicity culminating in resignation FonMin and probable fall of govt.
Granting Indo econ assistance under MSA in return for vague watered-down guarantees wld only mean decline US prestige, continuance undesirable attention to presence MSA mission in Indo, and failure to win for US any expression of gratitude for our efforts in Indo behalf.
Consequently suggest to Dept that in answer to question at press conf Secy Acheson issue statement along fol lines: “US has watched with pleasure growth of Indo Repub during past two years. During revolution US gave what encouragement it properly cld to emerging new nation, although of course estab of Indo State is credit to Indo efforts alone. US also saw fit support Indo cause before UN and in other internatl dealings. Since transfer of sovereignty US has watched with admiration efforts of new nation to secure its democracy at home and has noted with satis that despite internal troubles Indos have succeeded in utilizing their rich natural resources to build favorable balance of payment and accumulate important gold reserves and fon exchange holdings. The US regrets that leading Indo polit groups have evidently concluded that it is not to their advantage to request US mil aid and accept the responsibilities which the request entails under MSA. US has no desire to comment on extent to which that conclusion results from domestic polit considerations, which are solely concern of Indos [Page 274] themselves. However, as a country which through its history has fought for independence US can understand that a new nation will proudly and sedulously guard against what it considers, sometimes erroneously, to be inroads on its sovereign rights.
If Govt of Indo does not see fit honor agreement as negotiated through its FonMin, US regrets necessity for terminating existing aid program. If some later Indo Govt shld come to understanding that Indos own self-interest wld better be served by closer relations with US and desire to ask assistance US Amer Govt wld within framework of then existing circumstances be glad give Indos friendly hearing. For present US is confident that even without Amer grant aid Indos can through own efforts arrive at satis solution own problems. Indos can well afford to pay for what econ and tech help they need and can apply in normal way for whatever priority items they desire. In this connection US must of course give first consideration to those nations which are in firing line against Communism.”