Office of the Historian

756C.022/1–2552

No. 183
Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Bonbright) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews)1

top secret
Washington, February 4, 1952.

Subject:

  • Hague Discussions Regarding New Guinea.

The following is in response to a suggestion from Mr. Nolting.2

On January 29 Ambassador Cochran advanced a personal formula to the Indonesian Foreign Minister whereunder (1) the New Guinea question would remain on The Hague agenda; (2) the Netherlands would agree to suspend Parliamentary action on amending the Netherlands Constitution on New Guinea pending elections; (3) the two Delegations now meeting at The Hague would proceed with negotiating the revision of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union; and (4) the two parties would agree that if they could not by bilateral negotiations reach agreement on New Guinea within a fixed period of time after concluding the revision of the Union, they would submit the New Guinea question to an international body to be selected jointly by the two parties and would pledge themselves to abide by the decision of that body regarding New Guinea.

Judging from The Hague’s telegram 791 of February 1,3 it looks as if the Dutch may already have gone a long way toward meeting three of Ambassador Cochran’s four-point formula without any prodding from us. The Embassy has been informed that at a special session of the Netherlands Cabinet on January 31 it was decided that if the Indonesian Delegation wished to continue talks regarding New Guinea, the Indonesian Government, on its own initiative, may refer the specific issue of sovereignty over New Guinea to an international law body. Meanwhile, during the time the dispute over sovereignty of New Guinea is being handled by a court, the Dutch would be agreeable to continue talks on other political problems relating to New Guinea.

The Netherlands Foreign Office has pointed out that the Cabinet’s proposal avoided mentioning either the Union Court of Arbitration or the International Court of Justice because, if arbitration is agreeable to the Indonesians, the specific body can be worked out between the two Governments. Parenthetically, I may say it seems to us the Foreign Office view may be somewhat on the optimistic [Page 255] side regarding the ease with which agreement could be worked out between the two Governments regarding a specific body.

The above Dutch proposals do not meet Ambassador Cochran’s second point regarding suspension of Parliamentary action to amend the Netherlands Constitution on the New Guinea question pending elections this Spring. It is clear, however, that Netherlands Parliamentary action to amend the Netherlands Constitution on this matter in no way will affect the ultimate disposition of sovereignty over New Guinea and the Netherlands willingness to submit the question of sovereignty to an international law body should be sufficient evidence of this for the Indonesians.

At this juncture it is important to emphasize that the Dutch have indicated their willingness to submit the question of sovereignty over New Guinea to international adjudication or arbitration without any urging from us. It is in our interest, I believe, that we continue as long as may be possible to avoid utilizing our influence with the Dutch on the New Guinea issue so as to reserve that influence for other purposes relating to Dutch participation in European affairs.4

  1. Drafted by Joseph W. Scott, Officer in Charge of Swiss and Benelux Affairs.↩
  2. Frederick E. Nolting, Special Assistant to Matthews.↩
  3. Not printed.↩

  4. On the same day, Lacy commented on this memorandum in the following memorandum to Allison:

    “Mr. Coerr and I have changed our minds about the desirability of recommending a positive course of action to the Secretary now in the matter of New Guinea. We believe it best to do nothing at this moment; this position we adopt because of (a) Cochran’s No. 1107, February 2 [not printed] from which it seems clear to us that any further efforts on Cochran’s part to persuade the Indonesians to accept what is now a Dutch proposal will be unproductive, or worse, and (b) the considerations which Jo Scott has embodied in the memorandum which he has prepared for Mr. Bonbright to send to Mr. Matthews (copy attached). We hope you agree.” (656.56D/2–452)

    On the file copy of Lacy’s memorandum appears Allison’s notation: “OK. JA.”

    ↩