Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2

690B.9321/4–2954

No. 162
The Ambassador in Burma (Sebald) to the Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs (Bonsal)

top secret

Rangoon, April 29, 1954.

Dear Phil: I hope you have had an opportunity to read Taipei’s secret despatch no. 573, April 6, 1954, on the subject, “Some Observations on the Conduct of the First Phase of the Evacuation of Li Mi’s Troops From Burma”.¹ After you have read this despatch, I am sure you will agree with me that the story which it tells, a story which obviously is far from complete, is fantastic.

I read the despatch, not with a feeling of “I told you so”, but rather with a sense of depression brought on by the realization that the United States Government could be so thoroughly hoodwinked by a friendly government. In consequence, its officers were placed in the position of assuring another friendly government in all good faith of Chinese bona fides, in the negotiations which took place in Rangoon, Bangkok, and elsewhere over a period of so many months. I note from the despatch under reference that the Chinese Foreign Minister, among others, reportedly took part in a conference held on June 9, 1953, at which certain basic Chinese policy regarding the proposed evacuation was formulated. Thereafter, we in the field were called upon again and again to nurse along, in strong language and with soothing promises, the Burmese and others, and to explain away the Chinese delays and frustrations which, as indicated in the despatch, were agreed upon in advance and actually carried out according to plan.

The reference despatch is also interesting in explaining the volte-face of the Chinese when the prospect of a second evacuation was suddenly thrown into the mill for negotiation. That we by that time did not voice our suspicions of Chinese wangling in this affair, is something of a paradox to me, especially in the light of my telegrams no. 396, October 27, 1953² and no. 504, November 23, 1953.

Fortunately for all parties concerned, the evacuation of a goodly portion of the KMT’s from Burma appears to have satisfied the Burmese Government and people that at least the United States Government has done its utmost to bring about a successful evacuation. This satisfaction will be increased, I believe, if the Myawadi evacuation now planned is successfully carried out. I hope that this will be so, and that when the Committee disbands, having completed a “very successful operation”, we shall see the end of this problem.

I raise this matter at this time because of my concern over the possibility that eventually complete information regarding Chinese duplicity in the “first phase” evacuation might fall into the hands of the Burmese Government. In the Orient, there are no secrets, and sooner or later it appears almost inevitable that some dissident person, Chinese or Karen, will inform Burmese Intelligence of what actually took place. There is also the possibility that the Burmese Army may already have captured sufficient documentary evidence from KMT headquarters and elsewhere to piece together a fairly accurate story regarding the first evacuation. I hope that my fears are unfounded, but we may as well be realistic and be prepared for the worst.

Sincerely yours,

Bill

1. Despatch 573 includes a summary which reads:

   “Information available to the Embassy indicates that the Chinese Government at one time adopted a plan for token compliance with the UN Resolution by withdrawing a part of Li Mi’s forces from Burma, leaving the bulk intact for future operations against the Communist rear. This plan, known as Operation T’ien (‘heaven’) was later abandoned in favor of a complete withdrawal. However, certain facets of the operation were apparently set in motion during the First Phase of the evacuation which would explain the curious performance put on by an evacuee who masqueraded as Lieutenant General Lu Kuo-ch’uan, Commanding General of the 26th Army.

   “It is possible that unexpected factors beyond the Chinese Government’s control made this operation impossible and brought about the abrupt decision to open negotiations for the withdrawal of several thousand additional troops immediately following the completion of the First Phase in December 1953. … Those Chinese officials responsible for forcing the decision to withdraw all of Li Mi’s troops evidently had to overcome powerful pro-Li Mi elements within the several branches of the Government.” (690B.9321/4–654)

2. In telegram 396 from Rangoon, Sebald predicted that the Chinese troops in Burma would continue to present a problem after the completion of the then planned evacuation, especially because of their reported cooperation with the Karens in the Moulmein area. (690B.9321/10–2753)