Office of the Historian

690B.9321/3–2554: Telegram

No. 157
The Chargé in Thailand (Parsons) to the Department of State1

secret
Bangkok, March 25, 1954—11 a.m.

1971. In accordance instructions (Deptel 1847),2 I called on Foreign Minister3 24 March to urge Thai agreement to GUB proposal March 17 for limited cease-fire Palu area enable foreign forces evacuate from Tenasserim area. Foreign Minister assured me Thai Government desires complete evacuation project soonest possible. However, stated Cabinet council had thoroughly considered GUB proposal on 22 March and rejected it as inadequate guarantee safety evacuation personnel. Foreign Minister handed me note dated 23 March in reply Embassy’s note 18 March on subject (Embtel 1929 note 2)4 substance of which follows: Ministry “reiterates that sufficient guarantees must be forthcoming for the control, safety, and cease-fire in the Tenasserim area before evacuation could be undertaken” ....5 “Ministry regrets” that GUB note of 17 March “does not appear, especially in its last part, to offer such guarantees. Much as the Ministry would desire to see as great a measure of evacuation as possible of foreign forces from Burma in accordance with United Nations resolutions on the subject, it would appear that there is not yet a reasonable assurance that the proposed evacuation operation can be undertaken with success and without incident.” Foreign Minister particularly emphasized last phrase of Ministry’s note. Contents not yet passed Burmese Embassy and will discuss further action with Sebald on arrival Bangkok today.6

I then discussed informally with Foreign Minister [proposal] of General Li Tse-fen (Embtel 1953),7 namely that since KMTs claim they exercise effective control over area east of Dawna range to Thai border, KMT forces could themselves guarantee cease-fire that area for evacuation purposes provided GUB would withhold [Page 216] military action in area until evacuation completed. Foreign Minister said proposal, if and when made, would have to be examined for military feasibility, and if Thai military approved then Cabinet council would probably approve. Question would still remain of GUB reaction such proposal and since GUB has registered negative on past proposals for cease-fire east of Dawna range careful groundwork would have to be laid to obtain GUB agreement, provided Thai Government agrees. Possibility favorable action all concerned prior rains mid-April dubious. If Li proposal fails, only remaining possibility lies in GUB establishing effective military control over area before evacuation can be undertaken. However, I am asking Palmer endeavor obtain full [committee] agreement to Li proposal enable Thai representative clear with own government before presenting to GUB. All Thai representatives Joint Committee absent Bangkok since 21 March not expected return until 26–27 March.

General Phao’s Chief of Staff Colonel Charoenrit visited Mae Saud several days ago, informed Embassy he believes GUB forces will capture Myawadi by end March; Ministry Interior has moved 400 police into area in case alien forces driven from Burma into Thailand; believes KMT-Karens-Mons unable cope with GUB forces. His views diametrically opposed those General Li Tse-fen who claims KMTs control area. Charoenrit also complained GUB planes bombed over Thai border killing several Thais near Mae Saud recently.

Parsons
  1. Repeated to Rangoon and Taipei.↩
  2. Not printed.↩
  3. Prince Wan Waithayakon Krommun Naradhip Bongsprabandh.↩
  4. In telegram 1929, Mar. 18, the Embassy reported that a note to the Thai Foreign Office paraphrasing Burma’s views on the Tenasserim evacuation proposal and requesting Thai participation had been delivered. (690B.9321/3–1854)↩
  5. Ellipsis in the source text.↩
  6. Sebald visited Bangkok Mar. 25–27. Telegram 1976 from Bangkok, Mar. 25, reported that the Embassy had transmitted the substance of the Thai note to the Burmese Embassy with an additional paragraph inviting a Burmese alternative proposal. (690B.9321/3–2554)↩
  7. Not printed.↩