Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2

690B.9321/2–354: Telegram

No. 145
The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Thailand¹

secret
priority

Washington, February 4, 1954—4:27 p.m.

1557. Your 1597.² Mae Sod plan approved in principle with understanding (a) not interfere urgent Mong Hsat evacuation and (b) implementation depends Thai and Burmese concurrence and solution practical difficulties.

(Chief among latter appear: GUB could not properly guarantee cease-fire or safe transport arms in uncontrolled area where moreover needs free hand against KNDO; need install new Thai facilities Mae Sod whereas Tachilek can presumably be readied short order, also question duplicate air facilities Chiengrai and Lampang; insecurity control teams which would also presumably divert needed personnel from Tachilek. Your comment invited.)

Inform Colonel I that while sensible to considerations your 1554³ Part I success of any further plan depends on Mong Hsat moving soonest, see our 1522⁴ and 1542 Part I sections 1 and 2(b).⁵

Outline plan to Burmese liaison soonest requesting views. Stress advantage Part IV your 1554 but make clear precedence northern operation. Take occasion point out disadvantage non participation Burmese in Committee.

Your 1600 first paragraph:⁶

(1) Bonus covered our 701 Taipei 1551 Bangkok.⁷ Solution debt problem awaits action our 698 to Taipei and last paragraph our 1542 to Bangkok.⁸

(2) Urge Colonel I that some troops should start moving even if all not assembled. Without this no prospect further negotiations with GUB on extension cease fire. Rangoon’s 759 Bangkok 163⁹ points out if hostilities resumed further negotiations extremely difficult.

(3) Airlift Chiengrai authorized. Report status preparations.

Smith

1. Repeated to Taipei and Rangoon.
2. Telegram 1597, Feb. 3, reported that the U.S. and Chinese representatives on the Joint Committee approved a tentative plan for evacuation of the troops in south Burma via Mae Sot; the Thai representative was consulting his government on the subject. (690B.9321/2–354)
3. Supra.
4. Telegram 1522, Jan. 29, instructed the Embassy to make it plain to Colonel I that the United States was not ready to support any request to extend the ceasefire either as to time or area unless substantial evacuation was underway before Feb. 14. (690B.9321/1–2954)
5. The sections under reference in telegram 1542, Feb. 2, instructed the Embassy to reiterate that the Mae Sot evacuation must not interfere with the Mong Hsat evacuation, that the latter should begin as soon as possible, and that a request for an extension of the ceasefire could only be supported if movement was underway. (690B.9321/2–254)
6. The paragraph under reference in telegram 1600, Feb. 4, stated that the delayed resumption of the evacuation was due to the lack of funds for the payment of debts and bonuses, the difficulty of assembling troops in Mong Hsat for evacuation, and the lack of authorization for an airlift from Chiengrai. (690B.9321/2–454)
7. Telegram 701 to Taipei, Feb. 3, authorized the expenditure of $45,000 to finance the bonuses for the evacuees. (690B.9321/2–154)
8. The paragraph under reference in telegram 1542, cited in footnote 5 above, stated that the United States agreed to finance the debt payments on the basis of value received and expected the Chinese Government to make the necessary advance payments. Telegram 698 to Taipei, Feb. 2, instructed the Embassy to press the Chinese Government to instruct Colonel I accordingly. (690B.9321/2–154)
9. Telegram 759, Feb. 2, reported increasing Burmese impatience at the delay in beginning the second phase of the evacuation. (690B.9321/2–254)