Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2

690B.9321/1–354: Telegram

No. 141
The Chargé in Burma (Acly) to the Department of State¹

secret
priority

Rangoon, January 3, 1954—5 p.m.

646. Embtel 622,² Deptel 562.³ Permanent Secretary called me to Foreign Office this morning and told me orally that although GUB not willing rejoin committee for reasons given reftel would cooperate fully with committee in carrying out evacuation proposed by Chinese. Said general arrangement used in first phase could be continued and any details requiring Burmese agreement could be handled through diplomatic channels. Burmese observers would be available as before.

Permanent Secretary gave me map showing zones in which GUB willing continue cease-fire: (a) until midnight February 14 entire area east of Salween River, (b) from midnight February 14 until midnight February 28 same area as far north as junction Salween with Nam Hsim River, thence western boundary cease-fire area follows Nam Hsim to about 21 degrees 25 minutes north, thence about NNE to Nam Loi River and thence along Nam Loi to Chinese border. Sending original map Bangkok first pouch.

Re arms which had been discussed briefly during previous visit he said GUB unable agree shipment arms through Rangoon. Said, however, GUB willing allow committee use airfield Keng Tung for direct air shipment arms, committee keeping custody and sending personnel to field for that purpose. In reply to my question how arms could be flown from Keng Tung without crossing Thailand he indicated that not his problem.

I took advantage opportunity raise question increasing Burmese share evacuation expenses pointing out heavy burden on US and Thailand. He replied would refer matter to appropriate authorities and inform Embassy of reaction.

I also asked whether GUB willing include Chinese POW’S and internees in evacuation. He replied that when Burmese POW’s released he saw no difficulty sending Chinese POW’s for inclusion in evacuation but would need consult colleagues. (I gave him substance Bangkok’s 1286⁴ of which he unaware.) He also appeared sympathetic to inclusion internees but will give definite answer later.

Comment: GUB appears eager cooperate to extent possible without losing face but decision not rejoin committee appears firm. Airfield Keng Tung regularly used by C–47’s but uncertain whether could take planes with longer range. Latest information available to air attaché June 52 showing runway 3900 by 150 feet gravel surface 30,000 pound load capacity. Shall send later information soonest.

Acly

1. Repeated to Bangkok and Taipei and to New Delhi for Ambassador Sebald.
2. In telegram 622, Dec. 26, 1953, the Embassy reported that Acly gave the Permanent Secretary of the Foreign Office, Tun Shein, a memorandum quoting paragraphs 1, 2, 4, and 6 and the substance of paragraph 7 of the Chinese aide-mémoire and urged that Burma rejoin the Joint Military Committee. Tun Shein said that previous experience led the Burmese Government to believe that the Chinese would use the Committee as a means of delaying evacuation and that the Burmese wished to avoid lending support to such tactics. (690B.9321/12–2653)
3. Telegram 562, Dec. 28, 1953, instructed the Embassy to approach the Burmese Government and seek its agreement to share in the additional evacuation expenses. (690B.9321/12–2653)
4. Telegram 1286, Dec. 24, 1953, reported that the Chinese had handed over 14 Burmese prisoners to the Burmese authorities at Tachilek. (690B.9321/12–2453)